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NEPAL’S TROUBLED TARAI REGION 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Unrest in the Tarai plains has exposed the weaknesses of 
Nepal’s peace process, could derail elections for a 
constituent assembly in November and, if not properly 
addressed, could start a new form of conflict. Madhesis – 
plainspeople who are some one third of the country’s 
population – have protested, sometimes violently, against 
the discrimination that has in effect excluded them from 
public life. Weeks of demonstrations and clashes between 
political rivals recently left several dozen dead. The 
government has offered to address issues such as increased 
electoral representation, affirmative action for marginalised 
groups and federalism but has dragged its feet over 
implementing dialogue. Tension had been building for 
several years but was largely ignored by the political 
elites and international observers, and the scale of the 
protest shocked even its own leaders. The problems will 
only be resolved by strengthening the national political 
process and making it both inclusive and responsive – 
starting with free and fair elections to a constituent 
assembly later this year. 
The Tarai plains stretch the length of the southern border 
and are home to half the total population, including many 
non-Madhesis (both indigenous ethnic groups and recent 
migrants from the hills). With comparatively good 
infrastructure, agriculture, industrial development and 
access to India across the open border, the Tarai is crucial 
to the economy. It is also an area of great political 
importance, both as a traditional base for the mainstream 
parties and as the only road link between otherwise 
inaccessible hill and mountain districts. 
The leaders of the Madhesi movement face difficult 
choices: they have mobilised public support but have also 
angered powerful constituencies. They now need to decide 
between a strategy of accommodation or continued 
confrontation. The Madhesi Janadhikar Forum (MJF) has 
emerged as a powerful umbrella group but lacks an 
organisational base and clear agenda. It is entering the 
electoral fray but if it is to challenge the established parties, 
it must first deal with rival Madhesi politicians competing 
for the same votes. There has also been a proliferation of 
Madhesi armed groups; some have expanded significantly 
in numbers, and their strategy and attitudes will affect the 
political process.  
The mood among Tarai residents is increasingly 
confrontational, with collapse of trust between most 
Madhesis and the government. Most believe that further 
violence is likely. Unresolved grievances and the hangover 
from the Maoist insurgency, especially the lack of 
reconciliation and the greater tolerance for violence, make 
a volatile mix. The unrest has given a glimmer of hope to 
diehard royalists and Hindu fundamentalists, including 
some from across the border, who see it as a chance to 
disrupt the peace process. 
The mainstream parties have changed their rhetoric but 
are as reluctant as ever to take action that would make for 
a more inclusive system. Strikes in the Tarai squeezed 
Kathmandu but not enough to force immediate 
concessions. Mainstream parties, particularly the Nepali 
Congress, rely on their Tarai electoral base but are unsure 
how to deal with the new state of flux. Unable to compete 
with Madhesi groups in radicalism, they have also been 
ineffective at communicating the positive steps they have 
taken, such as reforming citizenship laws. Competition 
within the governing coalition is hindering any bold 
moves. For the Maoists, the Tarai violence was a wake-up 
call: much of it was directed against their cadres, whose 
appearance of dominance was shattered. Nevertheless, they 
remain well organised, politically coherent and determined 
to reassert themselves. 
Engaging in serious negotiations will be a delicate 
process, with no party wanting to lose face. But the key 
issues are clear and still offer room for a reasonable 
compromise: 
? fair representation: the critical issue is ensuring the 
electoral system gives Madhesis a serious stake in 
the constituent assembly; 
? federalism and autonomy: the government’s 
commitment to federalism has yet to translate 
into action; without pre-empting the constituent 
assembly, steps are needed to demonstrate more 
serious intent, such as formation of a technical 
research commission that could develop a 
knowledge base for future discussions;  
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? rebuilding trust: confidence in national and local 
government will only come if there is decent 
governance, public security based on local 
community consent and improved delivery of 
services; 
? redress for heavy-handed suppression of protests: 
demands for compensation, honouring of dead 
protestors and follow-through on a commission of 
enquiry need to be met; and 
? steps towards affirmative action: some immediate 
moves to increase Madhesi representation in parties 
and state bodies could pave the way for longer-term 
measures to remove inequalities. 
Fixing the Tarai means first fixing some issues in 
Kathmandu and then dealing not only with Madhesis 
but all excluded groups. Cross-party unity in listening 
to grievances and pushing for their resolution through a 
legitimate, elected constituent assembly is the only way 
to a lasting solution. This requires a change in outlook 
and a delicate political balancing act: the Kathmandu 
government must do some things immediately in order 
to earn Madhesi trust but deciding any major issues 
before the elections to the constituent assembly could 
compromise the constitutional process. Despite the 
instability, elections are still possible and essential. But 
reshaping state identity and institutions to make all Nepali 
citizens feel part of the nation is a long-term task that will 
present challenges in the constituent assembly and beyond. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
To the Government of Nepal: 
1. Address the reasonable demands for political 
participation of all excluded groups (not just those 
whose protests have forced attention) by: 
(a) undertaking to discuss and resolve 
grievances not only with protest leaders 
but also with concerned parliamentarians, 
local community representatives and civil 
society representatives; 
(b) starting back-channel communications to 
draw armed factions into peaceful dialogue, 
while emphasising that they must sign up to 
the political process; and 
(c) using all available leverage to control armed 
groups and other organisations founded in 
reaction to the Madhesi movement, draw 
them into negotiations and prevent the 
communalisation of Tarai issues. 
2. Show willingness to make concessions on the basis 
of equal rights for all citizens by: 
(a) revising the electoral system to ensure fair 
representation of Madhesis and all other 
marginalised groups, including a fresh 
delineation of constituency boundaries if 
the mixed electoral system is retained; 
(b) improving communication, ensuring the 
government’s approach is clearly explained 
and that there are means to invite and pay 
attention to citizens’ concerns; 
(c) sending senior party leaders to the Tarai – 
as eight parties together not individually – 
to explain what the government has done 
and is doing to improve representation and 
make the constituent assembly a meaningful, 
inclusive exercise; 
(d) implementing some immediate affirmative 
action measures to boost Madhesi presence 
in the civil service;  
(e) initiating discussion on options for 
federalism, their implications and how 
to implement them; and 
(f) honouring Madhesis killed in protests, 
compensating their families and those 
injured, supporting the commission of 
enquiry into the state’s handling of the 
movement and guaranteeing its 
recommendations will not be ignored. 
3. Demonstrate firm commitment to constituent 
assembly elections by: 
(a) agreeing promptly on an acceptable electoral 
system, preferably by ensuring the Electoral 
Constituency Delimitation Commission 
delivers a revised proposal within its 
extended deadline that addresses Madhesi 
fears of gerrymandering;  
(b) announcing a realistic election timetable; 
(c) developing election security plans with 
support of all political constituencies and 
communities; and 
(d) insisting that other issues should not be 
addressed by further interim constitutional 
amendments but instead be left to the 
constituent assembly as the sole legitimate 
forum for resolving them. 
4. Restore law and order and rebuild trust in local 
administration and security forces by: 
(a) improving community relations through 
meetings between chief district officers 
(CDOs) and Madhesi political actors and 
intellectuals; holding meetings to listen 
and respond to the public’s concerns; and 
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ensuring that local government offices 
are well staffed, performing basic duties 
and more accessible; 
(b) balancing deployment of armed police with 
a greater emphasis on civil and community 
policing; 
(c) starting discussion on using affirmative action 
to redress ethnic and regional imbalances 
in the security forces through recruitment, 
training and promotion; and 
(d) considering the transfer of district 
administrators and police chiefs responsible 
for excessive security action and the 
appointment of more Madhesi officials in 
sensitive districts. 
To Madhesi Political Leaders and Opinion-makers: 
5. Continue pressing for fair electoral representation 
and inclusion within the framework of the 
constituent assembly by: 
(a) rejecting violence, devising forms of protest 
that do not adversely affect the economic and 
social life of people in the Tarai and bringing 
armed groups into the political process; 
(b) taking part in the elections to the constituent 
assembly; 
(c) showing flexibility on the new electoral 
system if the government commits itself 
to fair representation; and 
(d) cooperating in the commission of enquiry 
and seeking to redress grievances by 
judicial means. 
6. Avoid replicating exclusive models at the regional 
level and work to reduce communal tensions by: 
(a) making space for women’s voices in the 
movement and on negotiating delegations; 
(b) ensuring representation of Muslims, Tarai 
janajati communities and all Hindu castes 
including Dalits; and 
(c) not insisting on a unitary Madhesi identity 
if it is unacceptable to some communities.  
To the National Political Parties: 
7. Consult excluded groups within and beyond parties 
and start to explore detailed policies of concern to 
them such as federalism and affirmative action. 
8. Wherever possible build eight-party consensus and 
also involve parties not represented in government, 
including the legislature’s official opposition. 
9. Implement Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
commitments on representation of marginalised 
communities within parties, explore ways to make 
party leaderships more representative and pay 
greater attention to the concerns of Madhesi and 
other activists within parties. 
To the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN): 
10. Extend technical support to inter-party discussions 
on development of revised electoral models.  
To the International Community: 
11. Continue to support the peace process, stressing 
respect for the principles enshrined in peace 
agreements and urging full implementation of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the interim 
constitution. 
12. Maintain momentum for elections with both 
positive political pressure and practical assistance, 
welcome the announcement of a realistic election 
timetable and maintain strong public support for 
the process. 
13. Support resolving the demands of Madhesis and 
other groups within the framework of the peace 
agreement and following its principles. 
14. Donors offering development and peace process 
assistance should consider additional help for 
building Madhesi civil society capacity and 
supporting serious, independent academic research 
into issues affecting all marginalised communities.  
Kathmandu/Brussels, 9 July 2007 
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NEPAL’S TROUBLED TARAI REGION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Tarai, a long-neglected borderland, now occupies the 
centre of Nepal’s political stage.1 The demands for 
political representation raised by its people cut to the heart 
of the peace deal and constitutional process; they also 
offer more direct challenges to the governing Seven-Party 
Alliance (SPA)-Maoist coalition.2 Violent clashes have 
left the Tarai districts in a fragile state: people are angry 
and have lost trust in the state; politics is in flux as new 
groups emerge; demands have become more radical; and 
constructive talks have yet to get underway, even though 
the outlines of a negotiable agenda are clear. 
Lack of background knowledge and the fast pace of recent 
events make this situation particularly hard to assess with 
certainty. Although clashes between plains-origin 
Madhesis and hill-origin pahadis have gained prominence, 
identity politics in Nepal is far more complex than this 
split suggests. The Madhesi issue must be seen in the 
broader context of the centre-periphery divide and the 
interplay of geography, caste, ethnicity and politics in 
 
 
1 Background reading on the Tarai includes Frederick H. Gaige, 
Regionalism and National Unity in Nepal (Berkley and Los 
Angeles, 1975); Hari Bansh Jha, The Tarai Community and 
National Integration in Nepal (Kathmandu, 1993); Basanta 
Thapa and Mohan Mainali (eds.), Madhes: samsya ra 
sambhavana (Kathmandu, 2006); Mahendra Lawoti, Towards a 
Democratic Nepal (New Delhi, 2005); and Bhuwan Joshi and 
Leo Rose, Democratic Innovations in Nepal: A Case Study of 
Political Acculturation (Berkley and Los Angeles, 1966). 
Seminar papers include Ram Prakash Yadav, “Madhesi; A 
Disadvantaged Social Group”, presented at a conference 
organised by Jaghrit Nepal, Kathmandu, December 2006; and 
Shree Govind Shah, “Social Inclusion of Madheshi Community 
in Nation Building”, presented at a conference on “Social 
Inclusion and Nation Building in Nepal”, Kathmandu, February 
2006. Blogs including madhesi.wordpress.com and Paramendra 
Bhagat’s demrepubnepal.blogspot.com are useful sources on 
Madhesi issues and also sites for some debates.  
2 The parliamentary parties that make up the SPA are the Nepali 
Congress (NC); Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-
Leninist, UML); Nepal Sadbhavana Party (Anandidevi, NSP 
(A)); Nepali Congress (Democratic, NC(D)); Janamorcha Nepal; 
Nepal Workers and Peasants Party (NWPP); and United Left 
Front (ULF).  
Nepal. Discrimination spans the country, with several 
communities in the hills facing similar exclusion. 
However, Madhesis have grievances unique to them, 
and the Madhesi movement has unquestionably raised 
critical issues; whether and how they are addressed will 
have a profound impact on the peace process and the 
reshaping of national politics. 
This report sets out the issues, describes the political 
players and their interests, assesses the course of the 
Madhesi movement and outlines possible scenarios. It is a 
first effort to present essential information on a situation 
to which most outsiders, Crisis Group included, should 
probably have paid more serious attention earlier.3 Based 
primarily on field research in the eastern-central and mid-
western Tarai, bordering Indian states and Kathmandu, it 
includes detailed coverage not only of domestic actors but 
also of Indian interests and the particular significance 
of the open border and the web of social, economic and 
political links that stretch across it. The report reflects the 
concentration of much recent political activity in the 
eastern Tarai districts (a disproportionately high proportion 
of Madhesi leaders come from Maithili-speaking 
communities in Saptari, Siraha and adjoining districts4); 
Crisis Group also interviewed activists of minority Tarai 
communities, including Tharus and Muslims, and future 
reporting will examine their concerns (often at odds with 
Madhesi leaders) in more detail.  
 
 
3 Some commentators did warn of trouble, for example, C.K. 
Lal, “The Tarai cauldron”, Nepali Times, 28 February 2003, and 
“We Nepalis. How to make Nepalipan more inclusive”, Nepali 
Times, 14 March 2003; and Suman Pradhan, “Tarai tinderbox”, 
Nepali Times, 11 August 2006. Recent Crisis Group reporting 
includes Asia Reports N°115, Nepal: From People Power to 
Peace?, 10 May 2006; N°126, Nepal’s Peace Agreement: Making 
it Work, 15 December 2006; N°128, Nepal’s Constitutional 
Process, 26 February 2007; and N°132 Nepal’s Maoists: Purists 
or Pragmatists?, 18 May 2007. 
4 Maithili-speakers include MJF leader Upendra Yadav, 
senior Maoist Madhesi leader Matrika Yadav, both JTMM 
faction leaders (Goit and Jwala Singh) and prominent 
mainstream leaders such as NSP’s Rajendra Mahato and 
Anil Jha, NC’s Mahant Thakur and Ram Baran Yadav and 
NC(D)’s Bimalendra Nidhi. 
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II. MADHES AND MADHESIS: 
THE ISSUES 
The Tarai is the mostly low-lying land along Nepal’s 
border with India.5 It forms about a quarter of the country’s 
total area, in an 885km strip stretching from the Mahakali 
River in the west to the Mechi River in the east, with a 
width varying from four to 52km. The Tarai also includes 
some low hills (the Siwalik range) and valleys to their 
north (the inner Tarai). It was incorporated into the territory 
of Nepal during its unification in the late eighteenth 
century and in the decades of expansion that lasted until 
the 1814 war with the British East India Company.6  
Historically sparsely populated in part because of its once 
dense malarial jungles, the Tarai is now home to around 
half the country’s population.7 They can be broadly divided 
into three categories: indigenous groups; communities 
which have cross-border cultural, linguistic and kinship 
links; and a large number of migrants from the hills, who 
moved into the area as it opened for development in the 
latter half of the twentieth century.8 Migration has also 
taken place from the southern plains (present-day India) 
into the Tarai in earlier periods as well as in the twentieth 
century, though to a lesser degree. According to the 2001 
census, hill-origin groups make up roughly one third of 
Tarai residents.9  
The term “Madhes” is used as a near synonym of Tarai but 
it, and “Madhesi” (used for people), have distinct political 
connotations.10 Madhes generally denotes the plains of 
 
 
5 The Tarai includes twenty districts: from east to west, Jhapa, 
Morang, Sunsari, Saptari, Siraha, Dhanusha, Mahottari, Sarlahi, 
Rautahat, Bara, Parsa, Chitwan, Nawalparasi, Rupandehi, 
Kapilbastu, Dang, Banke, Bardia, Kailali and Kanchanpur. 
6 The current boundaries of Nepal, including the extent of its 
Tarai territory, were defined in the 1816 Sugauli treaty following 
the defeat at the hands of the British East India Company. The 
only subsequent change was the UK’s return of some areas to 
south western Nepal (known as the naya muluk, “new country”) 
in recognition of its assistance in the 1857 Indian rebellion. 
7 In 1954, one third of Nepal’s population lived in the Tarai; by 
2001 the figure was almost one half. Ram Prakash Yadav, 
“Madhesi: A Disadvantaged Social Group”, op. cit. All Madhesi 
political actors view the census with suspicion, claiming that 
pahadis were over-counted (migrants to the Tarai sometimes 
being included there, in their original district, as well as in 
Kathmandu if they had a home there) while Madhesis lacking 
citizenship certificates and land title were undercounted. 
8 Gaige, Regionalism, op. cit., p. 2. 
9 Yadav, “Madhesi”, op. cit. 
10 “Madhes” is derived from the Sanskrit madhyadesh, meaning 
“middle country”. In broad terms it can refer to a region 
stretching from the Himalayan foothills to the Vindhya hills 
of central India. The narrower reference “Madhes” in current 
usage is a relatively recent development. 
eastern and central Tarai, while Madhesis have been 
defined as non-pahadis with plains languages as their 
mother tongue, regardless of their place of birth or 
residence.11 The term encompasses both caste Hindus12 
and Muslims and, in some definitions, the indigenous Tarai 
ethnic groups.13 However, many ethnic groups, especially 
the Tharus in mid-western Tarai and Rajbanshis, claim 
an independent identity, saying they are the original 
inhabitants of the Tarai, and Madhesis came in much later 
as migrants.14 Most Tharus in the eastern belt, which has a 
Madhesi majority, are comfortable being identified as 
Madhesis.  
Even as they accept that some migration did take place, 
Madhesis take offence to being called outsiders and see 
themselves as people who have always lived in the 
region.15 Some argue that hill migrants settled in the Tarai 
should be labelled Madhesis as well but most plains people 
do not see them, however long resident, as Madhesi. The 
term is often distorted as Madise and used pejoratively 
for any plainspeople not considered “true Nepalis”.16 
Madhesis have only recently sought to reclaim the term; 
one slogan of the movement, which also appeared in 
 
 
11 Gaige, Regionalism, op. cit., p. 15. 
12 The Madhesi and pahadi caste systems are based on the same 
principle but are entirely separate and have been formally 
recognised as such since the development of Nepal’s first 
national legal code in 1854. Both theoretically encompass five 
categories: four varnas (major castes) – Brahman, Kshatriya, 
Vaishya and Shudra – and non-caste, “untouchable” Dalits. In 
practice, however, the pahadi system has no Vaishyas and 
Shudras while the Madhesi system (like that of Kathmandu’s 
Newars) is fully elaborated. 
13 Crisis Group interviews, Madhesi activists, Janakpur and 
Nepalgunj, May-June 2007. Most Madhesi politicians and 
academics argue Tarai janajatis should be defined as Madhesis 
because they live in the Madhes region. Yadav, “Madhesi”, 
op. cit. 
14 Crisis Group interview, Tharu activist, Nepalgunj, 12 June 
2007. Tharu activists say they are the Tarai’s original inhabitants 
and entirely distinct from Madhesis, and the region should be 
called Tharuhat. Bhulai Chaudhary, “The Social structure of 
Madhesi community resembles more to the Indian states like 
UP and Bihar than any Nepalese society”, The Telegraph, March 
2006. Tharus are spread across the Tarai. Despite efforts to 
develop a unitary identity, there are major linguistic and cultural 
differences between the (dominant) mid-western communities 
(whose language, Dangaura, is normally recognised as “standard” 
Tharu) and those in the east, who speak the languages of the 
surrounding Madhesi communities. See Giselle Krauskopff, 
“An ‘Indigenous Minority’ in a Border Area: Tharu ethnic 
associations, NGOs and the Nepalese state”, in Gellner (ed.), 
Resistance and the State, op. cit., pp. 199-243. 
15 Crisis Group interviews, Madhesi activists and analysts, 
Kathmandu, Birgunj and Janakpur, May-June 2007. 
16 Other terms such as dhoti (the Indian-origin dress of many 
Madhesi men) and bhaiyya (an informal term of address) are 
sometimes used insultingly or condescendingly. 
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Maithili-language wall-painting in Kathmandu and 
elsewhere, was “Say with pride, we are Madhesis”. 
The Tarai encompasses great linguistic and social diversity. 
Madhesis speak Maithili, Bhojpuri, Awadhi and Hindi, 
languages also spoken across the border, while ethnic 
groups such as the Tharus have their own languages.17 
Among Hindus, Brahmans and Kshatriya groups, primarily 
Thakurs and Rajputs, are at the top of the caste hierarchy, 
while the untouchables, Dalits, are considered impure.18 
There is also a substantial presence of the “middle castes”, 
like the Yadavs, who are otherwise at the bottom of the 
caste structure but rank above Dalits. Caste divisions 
govern social relations, play a significant role in forming 
political choices and often shape economic stratification. 
Across castes though, the family and social structure is 
deeply patriarchal. Women have little say in decision-
making, are at the bottom of development indicators 
and often have to work for long hours in exploitative 
conditions.19 Muslims form about 3 per cent of Nepal’s 
population and are largely spread across Tarai districts, 
especially Rautahat, Banke, Bardia and Kapilbastu.20 
Agriculture is still the basis of the Tarai economy but the 
region has slowly emerged as an industrial belt, especially 
the central to eastern corridor between Birgunj and 
 
 
17 Maithili is the most widely spoken language in Nepal after 
Nepali; along with Bhojpuri and Awadhi, it is closely related 
to Hindi and often referred to on the Indian side of the border 
as a regional variant. Ethnic groups speak languages from the 
Tibeto-Burman, Austro-Asiatic and Dravidian families. See 
Novel Kishore Rai and Vishnu S. Rai, “Language issues in 
Nepal”, in D.B. Gurung (ed.), Nepal Tomorrow: Voices and 
Visions (Kathmandu, 2003), pp. 498-499. 
18 In the Tarai, significant Dalit communities include Chamars 
(1.19 per cent of the national population) and Musahars (0.76 
per cent). There are also Dushad, Dhobi, Khatwe, Tamta, Santhal, 
Jhangad, Wantar, Kahar, Mali, Dome and Halkhor communities. 
For data and other information on Dalit issues, see Jagaran Media 
Centre, www.jagaranmedia.org.np; Hari Bansh Jha (ed.), Dalit 
and Dalit Women of Terai (Kathmandu, 2003); and “The Terai 
Dalits in Nepal”, ActionAid Nepal, 1999. 
19 According to one study, women’s literacy rates among Tarai-
origin groups are only one quarter of men’s. The female to male 
literacy ratio is 28:100, compared to 52:100 among pahadis. D. 
Chhetri, “Educationally Disadvantaged Ethnic Groups of Nepal”, 
study conducted for the Agricultural Projects Services Centre 
and International Development Research Centre, Kathmandu, 
1996. Madhesi Dalit women’s literacy rates are even lower, as 
little as 3.8 per cent in some communities. “Analysis of Caste, 
Ethnicity and Gender Data from 2001 Population Census in 
Preparation for Poverty Mapping and Wider PRSP Monitoring”, 
Tanka Prasad Memorial Foundation, Kathmandu, 2005. 
20 There is very little academic work on Muslims in Nepal. The 
most significant dates to the 1970s: Marc Gaborieau, Minorités 
musulmanes dans le royaume hindou du Nepal (Nanterre, 1977) 
and, in English, “Muslims in the Hindu Kingdom of Nepal”, 
Contributions to Indian Sociology, 1(v) (1972), pp. 84-105. 
Biratnagar.21 With a large section of the younger 
workforce migrating abroad as labour, the economy relies 
heavily on remittances. Madhesi communities are also 
divided along class lines. Some Madhesis have profited 
from their large landholdings; others have benefited from 
high educational qualifications to enter academic positions 
in Kathmandu and elsewhere. The experience and form of 
discrimination can vary according to class. For example, 
a middle-class Madhesi professional may face subtle 
insinuations about his national loyalties and find it hard to 
rise above a certain level but a lower-class Madhesi will 
find it hard to get basic access to opportunities and may 
receive lower wages than his co-workers; similarly, 
middle-class Madhesis with property or other interests in 
Kathmandu have a more positive view of the advantages 
of retaining an integrated state.  
Modern Nepali nationalism, largely conceived and 
institutionalised in the latter half of the twentieth 
century, was shaped around the monarchy, Hinduism 
and the Nepali language. This restrictive concept has 
always excluded Madhesis, whose distinct cultures and 
cross-border links have led hill Nepalis to view them 
with suspicion and derision. The psychological distance 
between Madhesis and the Nepali state, as well as other 
citizens, was aggravated by discriminatory policies. Some 
of this distance is centuries old but much reflects the more 
deliberate constructs of Rana and Panchayat policies.22 
Few older Madhesis will forget the harsh insistence on 
conforming to pahadi cultural norms embodied in the 
Panchayat slogan “ek desh, ek bhesh, ek bhasa” (“one 
country, one dress, one language”). Even moderate Madhesi 
intellectuals describe the cumulative effect as a form of 
“internal colonisation” and say that the overall goal of their 
movement is to achieve “emancipation from slavery”.23 
Academia and the media have paid scant attention to 
Madhesi concerns.24 While the grievances of the hill ethnic 
 
 
21 For a district-wise classification of major industries, see 
“Registered Industries in Department of Industries”, Federation 
of Nepalese Chambers of Commerce and Industry, Kathmandu, 
2007. 
22 The Ranas ruled Nepal under a hereditary premiership from 
1846 to 1951; the partyless Panchayat system, in effect direct 
royal rule, was instituted by King Mahendra two years after his 
1960 palace coup dismissed Nepal’s first elected government. 
See Crisis Group Asia Report N°99, Towards a Lasting Peace 
in Nepal: The Constitutional Issues, 15 June 2005. 
23 Crisis Group interview, Dr Hari Bansh Jha, Centre for 
Economic and Technical Studies, Lalitpur, 23 May 2007. 
24 International attention has been limited: political historians of 
the 1950s pay some attention to the Tarai, for example, Joshi 
and Rose, Democratic Innovations in Nepal: A Case Study of 
Political Acculturation, op. cit.; there has only been one full-
scale book dealing with regional politics, Gaige, Regionalism, 
op. cit.; there have been some more detailed studies of particular 
communities, for example, Arjun Guneratne, Many Tongues, 
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groups did command some attention in the democratic 
interlude between 1990 and 2002, Madhesi issues were 
ignored. Human rights organisations did not take up the 
issue of discrimination against Madhesis either,25 while 
international development agencies preferred to focus on 
hill ethnic groups (janajatis). This lack of interest was one 
of the spurs to the establishment of organisations such as 
the Madhesi Janadhikar Forum. 
There are a number of key issues: 
Citizenship. The 1964 Citizenship Act and 1990 
constitution imposed stringent criteria based on descent.26 
Already perceived as Indians, the absence of birth 
certificates and other documents to prove their Nepali 
origin made it almost impossible for Madhesis to acquire 
citizenship. Local officials often demanded land ownership 
titles before granting citizenship, which trapped Madhesis 
in a vicious cycle, because they could not get land titles 
without citizenship certificates. The naturalisation process 
required fluent spoken and written Nepali. A government 
commission in 1994 reported that almost 3.5 million 
Nepalis did not yet have citizenship certificates.27 As 
well as not owning land, those without citizenship could 
not apply for government jobs, register births or marriages, 
get a passport, stand for elections, register a business, get 
bank loans or access government benefits. In November 
2006, the citizenship law was amended, making anyone 
born in Nepal before 1990 and permanently resident 
eligible for citizenship. Naturalisation is now open to 
people who can speak or read any language used in Nepal. 
Language. State monolingualism has contributed to 
Madhesi marginalisation, be it from not benefiting from 
 
 
One People: The Making of Tharu Identity in Nepal (Ithaca, 
2002) and Krauskopff, op. cit., on Tharus; and on religion in the 
Tarai, for example, Richard Burghart, The Conditions of 
Listening: Essays on Religion, History and Politics in South 
Asia (Delhi, 1996). Nepali academics, including Madhesis, have 
done little on Madhesi politics, though more on economic and 
development issues as well as much work on Maithili literature. 
On the Nepali media’s lack of coverage of Madhes, see 
Dhirendra Premarshi, “Madhesko tutulko matra dekhne nepali 
midiya”, in Basanta Thapa and Mohan Mainali (eds.), Madhes: 
samsya ra sambhavana, op. cit. There are some exceptions: for 
example, in March 2005 the Social Science Baha organised a 
conference on Madhes, resulting in Thapa and Mainalis’ edited 
collection; the Kathmandu-based discussion forum Martin 
Chautari has also sustained long-term engagement, 
research and debate on Madhesi issues. 
25 Crisis Group interviews, Madhesi activists, Rajbiraj, Janakpur 
and Birgunj, May-June 2007. Many Madhesis complain national 
human rights organisations are staffed by pahadis who are 
insensitive to their concerns and do not take up Madhesi issues. 
26 Constitution of Nepal 1990, Part 2 (Arts. 8-10). 
27 For details see B.C. Upreti, “Nagariktako rajniti”, in Madhes: 
samasya ra sambhawana, op. cit., p. 108. 
Nepali-language education, facing disadvantages in 
entrance exams and job applications or being unable to 
join in national debates. Language has been a politically 
sensitive issue since the 1950s, with different groups 
demanding the right to communicate in their own 
languages and/or Hindi. When some municipalities sought 
to introduce local languages as the official language in 
their districts, the Supreme Court blocked the move.28 
Under-representation. Madhesis are under-represented 
in all areas of national life. They occupy less than 12 per 
cent of the posts in influential areas, including the 
judiciary, executive, legislature, political parties, industry 
and civil society, and less than five per cent in international 
organisations and multilateral donor projects.29 The 
security forces are most actively discriminatory, in 
particular the army, which has no senior Madhesi officers. 
Although statistics are hard to come by, there is a sense 
the post-1990 democratic period made things worse. A 
Madhesi commentator points out: “Until 1990 there used 
to be at least a dozen or more Madhesi CDOs [Chief 
District Officers] at any one time but now you’re hard 
pushed to find even a few. The palace had a long time to 
learn how to co-opt influential regional figures”.30 
Economic discrimination. The Tarai is the backbone of 
the national economy, containing more than 60 per cent 
of the agricultural land and contributing over two thirds of 
the GDP.31 Investment in some infrastructure has been 
significant but the focus has been on developing national 
communications rather than serving local populations. For 
example, the east-west highway, a vital transport artery, 
does not link even one Tarai district headquarter directly – 
all are on poor feeder roads. Madhesis are poorer and 
 
 
28 The decision was given on 1 June 1999, a date still marked as 
a black day by ethnic and regional activists. See Karl-Heinz 
Krämer, “Resistance and the State in Nepal: How representative 
is the Nepali state?”, in David Gellner (ed.) Resistance and the 
State: Nepalese experiences (Delhi, 2003), p. 189. 
29 Madhesis were 21 per cent of MPs in 1991, 18 per cent in 
1994 and 20 per cent in 1999; in the upper house, representation 
hovered between 8 and 15 per cent. Yadav, “Madhesi”, op. cit. 
In 2000, there were only nine Madhesi senior bureaucrats and 
three members of constitutional bodies. Madhesis hold just over 
one tenth of senior positions in the public and private sectors. 
Govind Neupane, Nepalko jatiya prashna (Kathmandu, 2000), 
cited in “Unequal Citizens: Gender, Caste and Ethnic Exclusion 
in Nepal - Summary”, DFID/World Bank, Kathmandu, 2006, p. 
60. In the two decades to 1991, they increased in the civil 
service by only 1.4 percentage points (to 8.4 per cent). Shah, 
“Social Inclusion”, op. cit. In 2001, they were 5.2 per cent of the 
staff in 91 international organisations and projects implemented 
by multilateral agencies. “Directory of the United Nations and 
Its related Specialised Agencies in Nepal”, UNDP, 2001, cited 
in ibid. 
30 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, 18 June 2007. 
31 See Shah, “Social Inclusion”, op. cit. 
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have lower education and health indicators than hill 
communities.32 Activists argue that this is an inevitable 
result of Kathmandu’s stranglehold on decision-making: 
even when large revenues are generated locally, they are 
disbursed on the whims of capital-centric bureaucrats. 
Changing demographic profile. Since the 1950s, the 
government has encouraged hill people to migrate to the 
plains. Facilitated by malaria eradication programs, 
clearing of forests and land resettlement schemes, the 
pahadi proportion of the population in the Tarai has 
increased five-fold from 1951.33 Hill-origin migrants even 
constitute the majority in several districts. Madhesi 
activists complain that with their relatively privileged 
background and extensive contacts in local administration 
due to cultural links, pahadis wield disproportionate 
influence. Many in the Kathmandu establishment have 
harboured fears that India would use Madhesis to increase 
control or take over Nepal; encouraging hill migration was 
a move to keep Madhesis, perceived as sympathetic to 
India, in check.  
Electoral under-representation. Madhesis make a strong 
case that they have been systematically under-represented 
in the electoral system: (i) the number of parliamentary 
seats in the Tarai does not reflect its population;34 (ii) 
constituencies have been delimited to dilute the Madhesi 
vote (many on a north-south strip pattern that introduces a 
sizeable hill electorate); and (iii) a disproportionate number 
of pahadis are selected by the main parties for their most 
winnable seats (in the 1999 elections, pahadi candidates 
won a majority of Tarai seats).35 
 
 
32 Literacy among Madhesis is 41 per cent but 68 per cent 
among Bahuns and Chhetris (the hill high castes) and Newars. 
Ram Prakash Yadav, “Madheshi issues”, paper presented at 
Jaghrit Nepal, Kathmandu, December 2006. There is disparity 
among Madhesis: Musahars, a Dalit community, have the 
lowest rate (7.3 per cent). Chhetri, “Educationally Disadvantaged”, 
op. cit. Tarai districts dominate the list of those furthest from 
Millennium Development Goal education targets. Crisis Group 
interview, Education for All program expert, Kathmandu, May 
2007. A 2002 study found half of Tarai districts but only 29 per 
cent of hill districts “worst affected” by poverty. Within the Tarai, 
there is higher poverty in Madhesi-majority districts, less in 
districts with more pahadi population. Sharma and Shah, “Nepal 
Report: The link between poverty and environment” cited in 
Shah, “Social Inclusion”, op. cit. For detailed statistics on health 
indicators, see www.un.org.np/health/district-profiles/index.htm. 
33 The 1951 census recorded 6 per cent pahadi population in 
the Tarai, the 2001 census 33 per cent. 
34 MJF leader Upendra Yadav said: “There are 10,000 people 
in one constituency in the hills and upper reaches and 100,000 
in the Tarai. This goes against the principle of one person, one 
vote”. Crisis Group interview, Birgunj, 28 June 2007. 
35 Yadav, “Madhesi”, op. cit. Of the 88 seats, 46 were won by 
pahadis. 
III. POLITICS AND PLAYERS 
A. POLITICS IN THE TARAI 
Since 1950, the Tarai has been a major political centre 
and a critical base for the mainstream parties. Most Nepali 
parties were formed in the Indian cities of Banaras or 
Calcutta, and leaders participated in the Indian freedom 
struggle.36 With the flow of people and ideas across the 
border (slightly less open during the rule of the Ranas 
before 1950 but still permeable), the parties naturally 
expanded into the Tarai. The insurrection against the 
Ranas was waged in Tarai districts with local support. 
India was a source of arms and a safe base for activists to 
launch cross-border attacks. While the main action was in 
the Tarai, the issues and demands were national.37 
A distinct, identity-based political consciousness emerged 
with formation of the Nepal Tarai Congress under 
Vedanand Jha in 1951. Its core demands included an 
autonomous Tarai, recognition of Hindi as a national 
language and adequate representation in the civil service.38 
The government’s 1957 imposition of Nepali as the sole 
medium of instruction sparked protests and clashes between 
the Tarai Congress and nationalists.39 The Tarai Congress 
failed to win a single seat in the 1959 parliamentary 
elections. The other prominent Madhesi leader during 
that period was Raghunath Thakur, who formed the 
Madhesi Mukti Andolan and demanded autonomy for 
the Tarai, appointment of Madhesis in police, army and 
the bureaucracy and landownership rights. Thakur also 
campaigned actively in India to win support for the Madhesi 
cause.40  
Mainstream leaders, such as the Nepali Congress’s B.P. 
Koirala, were seen as sympathetic to Madhesis and more 
 
 
36 The Banaras group included expatriates and exiles connected 
with earlier political episodes in Nepal and a large number of 
Nepali students. The Nepali Congress (NC) was formed with 
the merger of the Banaras-based Nepali National Congress and 
the Calcutta-based Nepal Democratic Congress. Joshi and Rose, 
op. cit., pp. 55, 61, 71. 
37 The anti-Rana agitation picked up in November 1950 after 
NC activists attacked Birgunj and captured government offices. 
Joshi and Rose, op. cit., pp. 74-75. 
38 Gaige, Regionalism, op. cit., p 109. 
39 Activists formed “Save Hindi” committees and held mass 
protests. The government temporarily abandoned enforcement 
of the Nepali-only primary education policy but later pushed it 
through. 
40 Jai Krishna Goit, “History of Terai in Nepal”, at madhesi. 
wordpress.com/2007/04/04/history-of-terai-in-nepal. Thakur 
later formed the Madhesi Janakrantikari Dal. Other leaders 
who raised the Madhesi issue in the 1960s included Ramji 
Mishra, Satyadev Mani Tripathi and Raghunath Raya Yadav. 
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willing to respect differences. Those who had long lived 
in Patna and Banaras and spoke Hindi publicly probably 
did not share the Kathmandu elite’s prejudices. However, 
King Mahendra viewed language issues as one tool in his 
effort to create a hill-based, homogeneous identity. 
Nepal’s division into five development regions and 
fourteen zones, seen as a ploy to maintain pahadi 
domination because it forced hill and plains areas into 
single units, created discontent but few Madhesi politicians 
challenged the state’s discriminatory tendencies, instead 
mostly allowing themselves to be co-opted at different 
levels.41 Still, democratic politics retained strong support. 
The Nepali Congress (NC) was the best established party 
but there was also a tradition of peasants’ and workers’ 
protest movements.42 An insurrection inspired by India’s 
Naxalites (South Asia’s original Maoists) shook the far 
south eastern Jhapa district in the early 1970s.43 
Caste has an important role in Tarai politics. The failure 
of radical left movements is attributed to the entrenched 
caste structure that makes it difficult to mobilise lower 
castes in significant numbers.44 During elections in 1959 
and more so through the 1990s, caste was significant for 
both selecting Madhesi candidates and determining 
voting patterns. A former politician of the Communist 
Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist, UML) said: “It 
all boils down to caste. For example, Yadavs, across 
parties, will coalesce if there is a Yadav candidate in the 
fray, not only in parliamentary but also civic association 
 
 
41 Crisis Group interview, Madhesi activist, Rajbiraj, 26 May 
2007. Madhesi politicians across the political spectrum claim 
the division was unscientific, did not take into account local 
aspirations and blocked devolution to the local level. Crisis Group 
interview, analyst, Kathmandu, June 2007. Many members of 
the politically influential Madhesi landowning elite joined the 
royal council or other government bodies, accepted district and 
regional administrator positions and had no interest in 
destabilising the situation. Nevertheless, in the 1980 referendum 
on the Panchayat system, there was higher support for multiparty 
democracy in the Tarai. See Martin Hoftun, William Raeper and 
John Whelpton, People, Politics and Ideology (Kathmandu, 
1999), p. 93. 
42 Crisis Group interview, Anil Shrestha, CPN(M) Parsa district 
in-charge, Birgunj, 28 May 2007. 
43 See Crisis Group Report, Nepal’s Maoists, op. cit., pp. 8-12. 
The Jhapali movement was the breeding ground for several 
leftist leaders who later moved in different directions, from R.K. 
Mainali (who joined the 2005 royal cabinet) to his brother C.P. 
Mainali, who heads the ULF party, a member of the SPA. On 
the Jhapali movement, see Deepak Thapa, A Kingdom Under 
Siege (Kathmandu, 2003), pp. 26-27. 
44 Crisis Group interview, Chandrakishore, Director, Centre 
for Social Research, Birgunj, 1 June 2007. Given the tight 
framework of Marxist class analysis, Nepali leftists, like 
their Indian counterparts, long refused to recognise caste and 
ethnicity as valid categories for political mobilisation. 
elections. The non-Yadav castes form another silent front 
with the sole aim of ensuring the victory of a non-Yadav”.45 
B. PARTIES 
The mainstream national political parties. The NC and 
UML have strong organisational structures and support 
bases in the Tarai. Mainstream leaders have their 
constituencies in the Tarai – for example, Prime Minister 
Koirala in Sunsari and UML General Secretary Nepal in 
Rautahat. In the first general election (1959) and in post-
1990 elections, a large majority of Madhesis has voted for 
the major national parties, especially NC.46 Though they 
have never offered a real voice to Madhesis, association 
with the large, established parties offers benefits such as 
government jobs and contracts, local and national political 
access and social status.47 Voting for national parties may 
also reflect Madhesis’ desire to be part of the mainstream 
and counter suspicions over their loyalties.48 Several 
Madhesis have risen to important leadership positions, 
especially in the NC,49 whose old guard won the support 
of many Madhesis. With electoral politics not revolving 
around issues of Madhesi identity, Madhesi leaders did 
not feel the need to raise grievances and concerns within 
parties and were content with posts for themselves.  
Mainstream parties have also tried to address Madhesi 
sensitivities at least on symbolic issues and especially 
during campaigns.50 With the recent rise of Madhesi 
identity politics, they have begun establishing Madhesi 
fronts. The UML has a Loktantrik Madhesi Sangathan 
(Democratic Madhesi Organisation), while the Krantikari 
Madhesi Morcha is affiliated with Janamorcha.51 
 
 
45 Crisis Group interview, Rajbiraj, 26 May 2007.  
46 The Nepal Tarai Congress failed to win a single seat in 
1959. The NSP won between three and six seats in each of the 
post-1990 parliamentary elections. For the two main parties 
the totals were: 21 UML, 50 NC in 1991; 35 UML, 39 NC in 
1994; 18 UML, 59 NC in 1999. 
47 Crisis Group interview, NC leader, Rajbiraj, 27 May 2007. 
48 Crisis Group interview, Chandrakishore, Birgunj, 1 June 
2007. 
49 Mahendra Narayan Nidhi was a top NC leader during the anti-
Panchayat agitation; Mahant Thakur was prominent through the 
1990s in NC party and ministerial positions; other Madhesi 
ministers in democratic governments have included Bijay Kumar 
Gachhedar, Jay Prakash Prasad Gupta, Ram Baran Yadav 
and Bimalendra Nidhi; Chitralekha Yadav has earned respect as 
House of Representatives and interim legislature deputy speaker. 
50 Hill-origin leaders give speeches in Hindi and other local 
languages during village meetings and door-to-door campaigning. 
Even conservative nationalists like the Rashtriya Prajatantra 
Party use Hindi posters to publicise rallies. 
51 The Krantikari Madhesi Morcha (KMM) is led by Ram 
Rijhan Yadav, a Madhesi leader from Siraha who had long 
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Nepal Sadbhavana Party. The NSP was the only 
regional party active in the post-1990 multiparty system.52 
Unable to register openly as a political movement, it was 
launched as a cultural association, the Nepal Sadbhavana 
Parishad, in 1983. Its core aim was political and cultural 
rights for Madhesis.53 With introduction of the multiparty 
system, it became a political party on 17 April 1990, 
headed by Gajendra Narayan Singh, a senior democratic 
leader from Saptari district, in the eastern Tarai. A long-
time NC activist and exile in India for eighteen years, he 
was elected to the National Panchayat in 1986 and raised 
Madhesi issues.54 Past association with a mainstream 
democratic party, extensive links in Kathmandu and Delhi 
and a support base in some Tarai districts helped him gain 
acceptability in the capital. Key NSP demands have been 
reformed citizenship laws; official recognition for Hindi; 
a federal system; and greater Madhesi representation in 
the civil service and security forces.55 It opposed the 1990 
constitution, though working within its framework, and 
has consistently demanded a constituent assembly.56 
The NSP has district committees across the Tarai but is 
stronger in the east.57 During the instability of the 1990s, 
it allied with all political groups to be in government and 
justified this by saying it was trying to make a difference 
for Madhesis from within. But this, coupled with inability 
to deliver on any of its demands, eroded the party’s 
credibility in the Tarai. The other top leaders were mostly 
 
 
been with the MJF and retained this affiliation for some time 
while heading the KMM. 
52 It gained official recognition despite constitutional restrictions 
on regional and ethnic parties and has maintained national party 
status by consistently winning over 3 per cent of the national 
vote in general elections. 
53 Well-known demographer and planner Harka Gurung’s 
categorisation of Madhesis as people of Indian origin helped 
trigger the NSP’s formation. Gajendra Narayan Singh was 
arrested while campaigning against Gurung’s stance; he 
established the NSP on his release. Rajendra Mahato, 
Hamare prerana ke srot – Karamvir Swargiya Gajendra 
Narayan Singh (Kathmandu, 2004). 
54 Ibid. 
55 See Hoftun et al., op. cit., pp. 330-333. A brief summary 
of the party position is at www.nepaldemocracy.org/ 
institutions/major_parties.htm#nsp. 
56 The NSP burnt copies of the 1990 constitution and demanded 
a new one through the democratic period but it participated 
in the political system. “Vartaman samasaya ka ek hi hal, 
samvidhan sabha ke liye janata main chal”, undated NSP(A) 
pamphlet. 
57 The NSP won six seats (4.1 per cent of the vote) in the 
first parliamentary elections in 1991, three seats (3.6 per 
cent) in 1994 and five seats (3.18 per cent) in 1999. Its 
candidates have won seats in Morang, Saptari, Sarlahi, 
Nawalparasi and Rupandehi but none from the west, mid-
west or far-west districts. 
upper caste landowners.58 Singh’s death in 2002 deprived 
the party of its most charismatic face and left it rife with 
factionalism and leadership squabbles. When the next 
leader, Badri Prasad Mandal, supported the king’s 4 
October 2002 decision to sack Prime Minister Sher 
Bahadur Deuba, the party split, with one faction headed 
by Mandal, the other, the NSP(A), a member of the SPA, 
by Singh’s widow, Anandi Devi.59 The two factions 
reunited in June 2007 under Anandi Devi. 
The Maoists. The Maoists established a Madhesi 
Rashtriya Mukti Morcha (Madhesi National Liberation 
Front, MRMM) in 2000 in Siliguri, India, under the 
leadership of Jai Krishna Goit. This was part of their 
strategy to tap into identity politics and win support 
among excluded communities. While MRMM leaders 
say the goal is an autonomous and discrimination-free 
Madhes, its true role is largely subordinate: supporting the 
CPN(M) by providing a regional front, developing locally 
popular policies, recruiting and organising. The Maoists 
emphasise the Madhes’s difference from the hills in terms 
of social structure and production relations and also stress 
that its problems stem from both pahadi, ruling-class 
policies and Madhesis’ own exploitative feudal and caste 
structures.60 MRMM leader Prabhu Sah says: “MRMM is 
the true representative of the Madhes. The NSP did raise 
the issue before us but we put it on the political agenda. We 
fought for it and lost our comrades in the armed struggle. 
Our contribution must be recognised”.61 
The Maoists face tough policy decisions. Since the 
formation of their autonomous people’s governments 
they have divided Madhes into two units: Tharuwan (in 
the west) and Madhes (in the east). This has angered 
Madhesi leaders; the official line has not changed but 
Maoists say they are open to revising it, although a unified 
province could still incorporate a separate Tharu 
administrative unit.62 The Maoists support the right to 
self-determination but caution this does not include 
secession.63 The MRMM demands proportional Madhesi 
 
 
58 The top leaders of the party include Hridayesh Tripathi, 
Rajendra Mahato, Sarita Giri and Anil Jha. All four are 
upper caste.  
59 This was not the NSP’s first split. It had earlier seen one 
leader, Ram Janam Tiwari, walk out and Hridayesh Tripathi 
form a short-lived Nepal Samajwadi Janata Dal before 
returning. 
60 Crisis Group interview, Prabhu Sah, MRMM general secretary, 
Kathmandu, 23 May 2007.  
61 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, 23 May 2007. 
62 Crisis Group interview, Athak, CPN(M) Banke district in-
charge, Nepalgunj, 15 June 2007. 
63 Crisis Group interview, Maoist leaders, Kathmandu, 23 
May 2007. See also Baburam Bhattarai, “Madhesi prashnalai 
herne dhrishtikonharu”, Lal Madhes, March 2006. Bhattarai 
recognises the differences in the population composition of 
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inclusion in state institutions; full distribution of citizenship 
certificates; use of Maithili, Bhojpuri and Awadhi as 
local official languages and protection of other cultural 
rights; reinvestment of Madhes tax revenues in the region; 
revolutionary land reform; and an end to dowry, women’s 
exploitation, untouchability and social discrimination.64 
Unlike the NSP, it opposes Hindi as an official link 
language in the Tarai, calling it an upper caste and 
Indian ploy.65 
The CPN(M) and MRMM have a common ideological 
and policy stand. A few top MRMM leaders are also 
influential within the Maoist hierarchy but Front leaders 
say they have autonomy to decide on policies and running 
of the organisation, and MRMM members are not 
necessarily Maoist members.66 The MRMM has a central 
committee of 22, three regional coordination committees 
and district committees.67 Matrika Prasad Yadav, who 
was appointed head of the MRMM in 2004, also led the 
Madhes autonomous government. However, at the district 
level, the head of the MRMM and the people’s 
government were usually different persons, though there 
was close cooperation between the organisations.68  
The MRMM has internal tensions, with Sah objecting 
to Yadav’s dual appointments as head of the front and 
minister; the rift is also attributed to caste tensions 
between members of the Yadav caste and non-Yadavs. 
In late June 2007, matters came to a head when the 
differences became public, and the party took direct 
control of the MRMM and appointed a new ad-hoc 
central committee. This division has trickled down to 
district units. Yadav has the upper-hand in the party 
hierarchy and commands more support but Sah has 
 
 
eastern and western Tarai and says federal units must be based 
on language and culture, economic and social situation, 
geography and popular will. The Maoists believe regional 
and ethnic self-determination is not only inherently justified 
but also better for national unity than a top-down, centralised 
approach. One Maoist Madhesi leader explains: “Even if you 
make Madhes a separate country, it will not be independent 
in this age of globalisation. What is needed is autonomy”. Crisis 
Group interview, Kathmandu, May 2007. 
64 Prabhu Sah, Janayuddha ra madhesi muktiko karyadisha 
(Madhesi Rashtriya Mukti Morcha, 2006), pp. 19-20. 
65 Ibid, p. 20. 
66 Crisis Group interview, Prabhu Sah, Kathmandu, June 2007. 
He said: “MRMM’s key aim is the national liberation of Madhes; 
the CPN(M)’s is communism. Theoretically, all those who 
support the MRMM cause may not support Maoist aims. In 
practical terms however, there is an overlap, and most MRMM 
members are also in the party”.  
67 The Mithila, Bhojpur and Awadh coordination committee 
serves as the link between central and district levels. 
68 Crisis Group interview, Maoist leader, Kathmandu, June 
2007. 
pockets of influence and the support of a few senior 
Maoist leaders.69 
The MRMM has links with all other Maoist fraternal 
ethnic organisations. It talks with leaders of these fronts 
but mostly within the framework of the party. Any 
decision on a common approach is made by the party 
leadership in consultation with the front leaders. The 
unity of the excluded nationalities is a key part of Maoist 
strategy. “Even if we get proportional representation, at 
best Madhesis are 40 per cent of the population”, Sah 
says. “If we ally with other communities, our voice can 
become decisive”.70 
Madhesi Janadhikar Forum.71 The MJF was established 
in 1997 and initially registered as an NGO. Founding 
leaders say the Maoists supported its creation.72 It 
developed as a cross-party intellectual forum to discuss 
and promote Madhesi concerns, publishing several 
research papers and books.73 Other activities included 
seminars and training programs to spread awareness, 
building an organisation and reaching out to Indian 
leaders.74 The MJF emerged as a leading force in the 
Madhesi movement and in April 2007 applied to the 
Election Commission to register as a political party.75 It 
had two main leaders – Jai Prakash Prasad Gupta (a 
Koirala protégé and former NC minister from Saptari who 
adopted the Madhesi cause after falling out of favour with 
the party leadership) and Upendra Yadav (a UML 
 
 
69 Crisis Group interviews, analysts, local journalists and 
Maoist activists, Kathmandu, Janakpur and Birgunj, May-
June 2007.  
70 Crisis Group interview, Prabhu Sah, Kathmandu, 23 May 
2007.  
71 The MJF is sometimes referred to in Nepal’s English-
language media as the MPRF, reflecting a translation of its 
Nepali name (Madhesi People’s Rights Forum). 
72 Crisis Group interviews, present and former MJF leaders, 
Biratnagar, May 2007. 
73 Among others, the MJF included Amresh Singh (NC), 
Ram Rijhan Yadav (Janamorcha) and independent activists. 
Publications include: Upendra Yadav, Nepal ka madhesi 
samuday: ek vivechana (Biratnagar, 1997), Nepali janandolan 
aur madhesi mukti ka sawal (Biratnagar, 2004), Madhes; 
madhesi samasya ra samadhan (Kathmandu, 2005), Conspiracy 
Against Madhesh (Kathmandu, 2005); Jai Prakash Prasad Gupta, 
Hari Bansh Jha, Amresh Narayan Jha and U. Yadav, Nepali 
madhesika samasya: char bichar (Kathmandu, 2004); Madhes 
bani (Kathmandu, 2003). 
74 “Madhesi janadhikar phoramko pratinidhi mandal bharat 
bhramanma”, Madhes Mulyankan, January 2006. A four-
member delegation led by Upendra Yadav visited Delhi, Patna 
and Lucknow in November 2005. Yadav has frequently visited 
India to rally support.  
75 The MJF provided over 32,000 signatures to support its 
application; the Election Commission is yet to make a formal 
decision. 
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candidate in the 1991 elections from Sunsari who briefly 
joined the Maoists but left them in 2004);76 Gupta quit the 
MJF in June 2007. Although it seeks to build a Madhes-
wide base, most leaders come from the eastern Tarai, 
and its central committee consists largely of upper and 
intermediate caste Hindus, with a predominance of 
Yadavs.77 
The MJF identifies internal colonisation as well as regional 
and racial discrimination against the Madhes as its key 
concerns. Its demands include declaration of a federal 
democratic republic with an undivided, autonomous 
Madhes, secularism, a proportional electoral system, 
citizenship certificates for all Madhesis, inclusion of 
Madhesis in all state organs, special schemes for Dalits and 
other oppressed Madhesi castes, local promotion and use 
of Maithili, Bhojpuri and Awadhi languages, recognition 
of Hindi as a lingua franca, end to internal migration of 
pahadis to Madhes, investment in Madhes of a substantial 
portion of taxes raised in the region, an end of discrimination 
against Nepali Muslims and official recognition for 
madrasas.78 MJF has also tied Madhesi politics to larger 
national developments. It opposed the king’s rule and 
Maoist violence and called for elections to the constituent 
assembly based on equitable population representation 
under UN supervision.79 
C. MILITANT AND FRINGE GROUPS 
Janatantrik Tarai Mukti Morcha. The JTMM is an 
armed Madhesi militant group which has split into three 
factions. Former MRMM leader Jai Krishna Goit broke 
from the Maoists to set up the organisation in July 2004. 
He was unhappy with pahadi domination of party 
leadership positions in the Madhes and discrimination 
against Madhesis in the People’s Liberation Army; he 
 
 
76 See “Madhes Violence: The Identity Clash in Nepal”, Conflict 
Study Centre, Kathmandu, 30 January 2007. Yadav also attended 
the Madhesi Rashtriya Mukti Morcha’s first national convention 
on 10-11 July 2003. MRMM, press statement, 30 July 2003. 
Upendra Yadav, Matrika Yadav and Suresh Ale Magar were 
arrested in Delhi in February 2004. While Matrika Yadav and Ale 
Magar were quietly handed over to Nepali authorities, Upendra 
Yadav was released within a few months. The Maoists accuse 
him of selling out to the Indian establishment and acting as an 
informer. He has spent most of his time after release in India, 
especially Bihar; although no one has evidence, some suspect that 
he developed ties with leaders of the Hindu right (including the 
then-governing BJP that ordered his release), other politicians and 
possibly intelligence agents. Crisis Group interview, former MJF 
leader, Biratnagar, 24 May 2007. 
77 Crisis Group interviews, MJF leaders, various districts, 
May-June 2007. 
78 MJF manifesto, 1997. 
79 Resolution of MJF central committee, 19 October 2005, 
Birgunj, reprinted in Madhes Mulyankan, January 2006. 
also resented Matrika Yadav’s appointment as the head of 
MRMM while he was shifted to the position of senior 
adviser.80 In August 2006, he expelled the group’s eastern 
commander, Nagendra Paswan (Jwala Singh). Goit says 
he acted against Singh for indiscipline; Singh, who 
complains of Goit’s dictatorial tendencies and caste 
attitudes,81 established his own JTMM group. Both 
factions endorse violence and have been responsible for 
abductions, extortion, physical attacks and murders. Still, 
neither can be dismissed as purely criminal.  
Goit and Singh have political agendas. Goit was a political 
activist with the UML before joining the Maoists, and 
Singh comes from a journalism background.82 In late June 
2007, JTMM(Goit (G)) split again, with eight rebels, 
led by Bisfot Singh, forming a splinter faction.83 
The Jwala Singh faction claims to have an organisation 
modelled on the Maoists, with a central committee, central 
and district level Tarai governments, a Tarai Liberation 
Army and district committees across the region.84 Goit 
has a central committee, East and West Tarai Regional 
Bureaus, village, ward and cell committees, and a parallel 
military organisation. For both factions, it is hard to 
confirm how their claims translate into ground reality, 
although they have certainly recruited members and 
expanded significantly. 
Goit’s faction identifies the Tarai issue as one of 
colonialism and has demanded independence. He refuses 
to call himself a Nepali citizen and believes that Nepal 
has no legal claim to Tarai.85 Goit has also demanded that 
all administrative posts in Tarai be filled by Madhesis and 
the government return the tax revenues raised from the 
region back to the people.  
Jwala Singh also questions Nepal’s historical claim to 
the Tarai.86 He identifies three main issues: the 
 
 
80 Crisis Group interview, analyst, Kathmandu, May 2007. 
81 Crisis Group interview, Jwala Singh, May 2007. 
82 Interview with Jwala Singh, INSEC Online, at 
www.inseconline.org/interview/Interview.pdf?newsid=53. 
Jwala Singh joined the Maoist parliamentary front Samyukta 
Janamorcha Nepal (United People’s Front) as Siraha district 
secretary in 1993. He was also a reporter with the Maoist 
weekly Janadesh and an office-bearer of the Federation of 
Nepalese Journalists, Siraha. 
83 “JTMM(G) also splits”, The Kathmandu Post, 27 June 
2007. Bisfot Singh accused Goit of seeking personal benefits 
and deserting the Madhes cause. 
84 Crisis Group interview, Jwala Singh, May 2007. 
85 Crisis Group interview, Jai Krishna Goit, June 2007. Goit 
asserted that the Tarai became a part of Nepal after 1816 and 
1860 treaties between British India and Nepal which were 
annulled after the Indo-Nepal treaty of 1950. This leaves Nepal, 
in his view, with no legal claim over the Tarai. 
86 Crisis Group interview, Jwala Singh, May 2007. 
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authoritarian pahadi state and its colonial exploitation of 
Madhes and Madhesis, class differences and caste 
differences.87 He believes the Madhesi movement has 
failed until now because its leaders have not picked up 
guns, saying: “First, the colonial problem needs to be 
solved through an armed struggle – our main aim is 
independence. Once we are free from pahadi rule, we 
can solve the other problems”.88 However, JTMM(Jwala 
Singh (JS)) sympathisers say this is a bargaining 
position; Singh recognises that independence may not be 
feasible and would be satisfied with a unified Madhes 
province within Nepal.89 He has also asked for a fair 
electoral system, a fresh census conducted in Madhes by 
Madhesis, appointment of only Madhesis in citizenship 
distribution teams, an end to Maoist fundraising and the 
return of seized property, as well as for all revenue 
collected from the Tarai to be spent in the region.90 
Fringe groups/local alliances. Some dozen armed groups 
in the Tarai claim to be fighting for the Madhes cause, 
including both JTMM factions.91 Little is known about 
them, and residents view them as opportunistic, making 
the most of weak law and order. Their activities are largely 
criminal, and most have not issued political manifestos. 
The Madhesi Tigers, formed almost a decade back but 
only recently again active, are believed to be led by Praful 
Yadav.92 Activities include abductions and killings, 
especially in Sunsari, Saptari and Siraha. The Tigers have 
clashed with the security forces in Saptari.93 The Nepal 
Defence Army supports a Hindu kingdom in Nepal. It 
may have royal links but it is unlikely Indian Hindutva 
(militant Hindu) organisations actively support it.94  
The Chure Bhawar Ekta Samaj (CBES) was set up by 
pahadis in the eastern Madhes, primarily those living 
around or north of the main highway, to protect their 
interests against growing Madhesi mobilisation. Its 
central committee is reportedly dominated by UML-
affiliated persons;95 others point to strong ties with the NC 
 
 
87 Interview with Jwala Singh, INSEC Online, op. cit. 
88 Crisis Group interview, Jwala Singh, May 2007. 
89 Crisis Group interviews, Janakpur, May 2007. 
90 Crisis Group interview, Jwala Singh, May 2007. 
91 Crisis Group interview, Chandrakishore, Birgunj, 1 June 2007. 
92 Crisis Group interviews, Madhesi activists, Biratnagar, 
Rajbiraj and Lahan, May 2007. 
93 For example, two Madhesi Tigers activists were killed in a 4 
May 2007 clash in Saptari. “Saptari, Siraha affected by 
Madhesi Tiger Terai strike”, ekantipur.com, 5 May 2007. 
94 Crisis Group interview, RSS activist, Raxaul, June 2007. 
Hindu fundamentalists in India dismiss the Nepal Defence 
Army as insignificant. 
95 A well-informed observer says nine of fourteen members 
are UML cadres. Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, 18 
June 2007. 
and the fact that there are ex-servicemen in its ranks.96 
Most Madhesis believe their opponents (including 
mainstream parties, state administration and security 
forces) encouraged and support it.97 The government has 
in effect recognised it by holding two rounds of formal 
talks with its representatives.98  
Hindu and royalist groups. The relationship between 
religion, royalism and Madhesi activism is complex and 
sometimes contradictory. Madhesi intellectuals quickly 
point out that King Mahendra’s palace-led Panchayat 
system, instituted in 1962, was most responsible for 
institutionalising discrimination and actively imposing 
unitary, pahadi, cultural norms; they also note King 
Birendra repeatedly used residual powers even in the 
democratic period to block citizenship reform.99 The MJF 
and JTMM agree on secularism and fighting for a federal 
republic.100 The MJF’s letter introducing its demands for 
the 1 June 2007 talks with the government was strongly 
anti-palace, accusing the NC, UML and CPN(M) of 
conspiring to retain a ceremonial monarchy, contrary to 
the wishes of the people’s movement.101 The Tarai seems 
to have retained some affection for the monarchy, 
however; Gyanendra attracted larger crowds for his tours 
there than elsewhere; some towns had relatively high 
turnout in the palace-backed, party-boycotted February 
2006 municipal elections; and local Madhesi elites have 
kept ties to the palace.102 
While all Madhesi political formations point to the need 
to address caste exploitation, the Maoist MRMM and 
JTMM(JS) identify Hindu Madhesi caste structures as 
one of the root causes of underdevelopment. For most 
 
 
96 Crisis Group interview, analyst, Kathmandu, June 2007. 
97 Crisis Group interviews, eastern Tarai districts, May-June 
2007. 
98 See “Govt, Chure Samaj start second round of talks”, 
nepalnews.com, 17 June 2007. 
99 For details on the legislation’s progress, see B.C. Upreti, 
“Nagariktako rajniti”, in Madhes, op. cit., pp. 108-109. 
100 On secularism, MJF manifesto, 1997; Crisis Group 
interview, Jwala Singh, May 2007. On anti-monarchism, MJF 
leader Upendra Yadav’s Conspiracy Against Madhesh, op. 
cit., published in the wake of Gyanendra’s takeover, was a 
blistering critique, whose two sections were “Royal regression 
and the future of democracy” and “Madhesh: a colony of 
terror under monarchy of Nepal”. 
101 MJF letter to government talks team, 1 June 2007. 
102 On crowds, Crisis Group interview, Madhesi civil 
society activist, Kathmandu, May 2007. On the elections, 
see “Poor turnout, hundreds arrested, one shot dead as 
municipal polls end”, The Kathmandu Post, 8 February 
2006. On palace ties, Crisis Group interview, Vijay Kanta 
Karna, Jaghrit, Lalitpur, May 2007. He suggested that Tarai 
feudal elites may have survived the conflict more easily 
than their hill counterparts because the Maoists were never 
strong enough to uproot them entirely. 
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other politicians (apart from Dalit activists), caste is of 
interest mainly as a potential basis for securing votes, 
and few complain about caste-based inequities. 
Although Madhesi and pahadi caste structures are 
separate, some observers suggest the shared adherence 
to mainstream Hinduism is one of the more solid bonds 
between hill and plains dwellers.103 The Madhesi 
movement did have some Hindu strands: resentment 
against the government’s May 2007 secularism 
declaration was used as a rallying call; some MJF 
central committee members have past associations with 
Hindutva groups; the MJF has also used inflammatory 
Hindu imagery in publicity.104 Smaller sects and 
popular gurus may also have helped rally anti-secular 
opinion.105 Although religious sentiment does not 
necessarily translate into Hindu nationalism or 
monarchism, there may be more sympathy for Hindu 
politics than Madhesi leaders and secular-oriented 
commentators would like to admit.106 
Pro-palace and active Hindutva groups also have 
multifaceted agendas. For some formerly prominent 
royalist politicians, active support of the Madhesi 
movement may have been an opportunity for 
rehabilitation as much as a deliberate plan to boost the 
king. A Birgunj-based analyst said:  
Royalists used a movement for social justice to gain 
social acceptability and get rehabilitated back in 
local politics after having been marginalised. It is 
also useful to remember that royalist politicians 
have other interests, too. Just because they are pro-
palace does not mean everything they do is for the 
king. But there was definitely an element which 
 
 
103 Many Madhesi commentators and activists stress the 
importance of religious ties, although most caution that these 
do not necessarily imply political support for the palace. Crisis 
Group interviews, May-June 2007. 
104 On resentment, Crisis Group interviews, Madhesi activists, 
May 2007. Much opposition centres on lack of consultation as 
much as the announcement, many arguing the government 
should have deferred the issue to the constituent assembly. On 
Hindutva associations, Crisis Group interviews, independent 
Madhesi analysts, local journalists, Kathmandu, Birgunj and 
Janakpur, May-June 2007. On inflammatory publicity, a magazine 
sympathetic to MJF carried an image of a Hindu rioter from the 
2002 Gujarat pogrom on its back cover (bizarrely juxtaposed 
with a Gandhi quote), Madhes Mulyankan, January 2006. 
105 For example, Sai Baba, Kripali Ji Maharaj, Radhe Radhe 
and other smaller, independent sects, organisations and 
religious leaders. Crisis Group interview, analyst, Kathmandu, 
May 2007.  
106 Crisis Group interview, analyst, Kathmandu, June 2007, 
Some point out that even Muslim maulvis (clerics) found royal 
Hinduism comfortable to live with because they knew where 
they were in Koranic terms – in a land of non-believers.  
wanted to create anarchy and destabilise the 
process.107  
Some smaller, moderately royalist parties have a small 
base in some Tarai pockets.108 Some Hindu political 
organisations, generally with Indian origins or links, have 
long been present in Nepal, including the Shiv Sena Nepal, 
the Hindu Swayamsevak Sangh and Vishwa Hindu 
Mahasangh.109 Newer organisations have also sprung up, 
although some may exist largely on paper.110 
 
 
107 Crisis Group interview, Chandrakishore, Birgunj, 1 June 
2007.  
108 For example, the Rashtriya Janashakti Party’s Renu Yadav 
is an MP for Saptari. She was formerly with the Rashtriya 
Prajatantra Party. 
109 The Shiv Sena Nepal participated in elections in the 1990s 
but had a negligible vote and failed to win a single seat. The 
Hindu Swayamsevak Sangh is the Nepal wing of the Indian 
Hindu extremist organisation Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh 
(RSS) and maintains close links with it and Vishwa Hindu 
Parishad (VHP). Theoretically, Vishwa Hindu Mahasangh 
(VHM) is a global Hindu organisation and VHP is affiliated 
with it; in practice, VHM relies almost wholly on VHP and 
other Indian Hindutva leaders.  
110 For example, Madhesi Hindu Samaj, Arjun Shakti Kendra, 
Ram Shakti Dal and Pashupati Lathi Samiti but little is known 
about them.  
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IV. THE MADHESI MOVEMENT 
A. VIOLENCE IN THE TARAI 
Madhesi discontent had been rising since it became 
apparent the April 2006 people’s movement would not 
lead to a rapid addressing of their grievances. Federalism 
emerged as a key demand of all Madhesi groups; armed 
outfits increased their activities; and Maoist-Madhesi 
tensions escalated, in some cases violently. The parties, 
happy to be back in power and concentrating on talks 
with the Maoists, paid little attention to Madhesi issues or 
political dynamics.111 When the draft interim constitution 
– prepared by the SPA and Maoists without broad 
consultation112 – became public in December 2006, it 
prompted protests. Madhesi groups, as well as Madhesi 
MPs across party lines, objected to silence on federalism 
and what they saw as an unfair electoral system.113  
The first flashpoint was in Nepalgunj, where the NSP had 
called a strike. The administration tried to block the march; 
at the same time, pahadis attacked Madhesi-owned shops 
in the heart of town. There were reports of retaliation by 
Madhesis but pahadi violence and police complicity were 
captured on camera. A DVD showing the anti-Madhesi 
rampage was widely circulated, fuelling anger and raising 
tensions.114  
The promulgation of the interim constitution spurred 21 
days of protests in January-February 2007. On 16 January, 
MJF leaders were arrested while burning copies of the 
document in Kathmandu. Three days later, MJF activists 
protesting the arrests in Lahan, Siraha district, clashed with 
Maoists, who shot dead Ramesh Kumar Mahato, a young 
MJF activist. On 20 January, as the MJF demanded action 
against the perpetrator and compensation, Maoist cadres 
seized his body and cremated it. The MJF stepped up 
protests against both the government, for inaction, and the 
 
 
111 Suman Pradhan, “Tarai tinderbox”, Nepali Times, 11 August 
2006.  
112 See Crisis Group Report, Nepal’s Constitutional Process, 
op. cit., pp. 5-10, 23-26.  
113 The interim constitution (Art. 63(3)) provided for a 425-
member constituent assembly with 205 elected by a first-past-
the-post system, 204 elected by proportional representation and 
sixteen “distinguished persons” selected by the interim council 
of ministers. Madhesi groups’ basic objection is that 
electoral constituencies are not delineated by equitable 
population representation. 
114 Crisis Group interview, human rights activist and eyewitness, 
Nepalgunj, 12 June 2007. Maoists say they created the DVD to 
expose the administration’s attitude towards Madhesis but NSP 
and MJF leaders used it to support their cause – something that 
still rankles with the Maoists. Crisis Group interviews, Maoist 
activists, May-June 2007. 
Maoists, whose leaders grudgingly and belatedly 
apologised. The escalation of tensions surprised even 
those who led the movement. “Everyone, including 
Madhesi leaders, failed to read the intensity of [popular 
sentiment]”, commented an Indian diplomat who followed 
events closely. “Even when Upendra Yadav and his 
colleagues burned the interim constitution, they did not 
quite realise what they were doing – and when the NSP 
called a bandh [strike], its own leaders were shocked at its 
success”.115 
Mahato’s killing was the spark for prolonged agitation. 
Madhesi activists called for a general strike in the Tarai 
and organised widespread protests; the government 
responded with curfews and an increased police presence. 
On 25 January, the MJF announced it would continue the 
protests indefinitely until the interim constitution was 
amended. Activists looted government offices, police posts, 
banks, mainstream parties’ district offices and media 
organisations; in a move reminiscent of the Maoists’ anti-
monarchy actions during the April 2006 movement, they 
vandalised statues of pahadi political leaders. The blocking 
of Kathmandu’s key supply routes had a more direct 
impact, leading to travel disruption, price rises and a petrol 
shortage. Although there were sporadic attacks on Tarai-
based pahadis, communalism was not a defining feature 
of the unrest. The state response was harsh: police shot 
dead more than 30 people and wounded 800.116 
The protests initially centred around Lahan and Janakpur 
but soon spread to all other major Tarai towns. The MJF 
organised some demonstrations but others were 
spontaneous or organised by local groups.117 These 
mobilised people, provided support to the injured and 
helped coordinate protests.118 Malangwa, Birgunj, Lahan 
and Biratnagar saw major clashes. In some cases, agitators 
turned their ire on journalists, blaming them for not 
covering the movement sufficiently.119  
 
 
115 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, 31 May 2007. 
116 The number of people killed remains unclear. Human rights 
organisations speak of 27, while Madhesi leaders say 40 or 42. 
Most Madhesis accept the highest figure, although around a 
dozen of the deaths may have come in clashes between Madhesi 
activists rather from police fire. Crisis Group interviews, 
Kathmandu, Biratnagar, Janakpur and Birgunj, May-June 2007. 
117 Crisis Group interviews, Madhesi activists, Birgunj and 
Rajbiraj, May 2007. 
118 Crisis Group interview, Rajeev Jha, Tarai Samrakshan 
Samiti (TSS), Janakpur, 29 May 2007. Organisations like the 
TSS kept in touch with all protesting groups, provided some 
logistical support, took injured to the hospital and collected 
donations for medical care. 
119 For example, protestors vandalised the Birgunj FM station and 
the Federation of Nepalese Journalists’ office; reporters covering 
demonstrations in Biratnagar, Birgunj, Inaruwa, Lahan, Bara and 
Saptari were threatened. Journalists say they covered the 
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The MJF emerged as the movement’s leading group but 
the protests lacked clear planning. “It was Lahan that 
created Upendra, not the other way around”, commented 
one observer.120 Caught off-guard by its sudden 
prominence, the MJF was not prepared to make the most 
of the public support. A district level leader admitted:  
We didn’t know how to handle the movement. We 
had four to six leaders and about 20 to 30 activists 
in each district, who had to suddenly deal with 
thousands of protestors. We had neither the 
organisation nor the leadership to channel this 
energy for the benefit of our party or to keep in 
touch with people who might have turned into long-
term supporters.121  
Participation in the protests cut across political divides; 
activists of other groups, from NC and UML to both 
JTMM factions, played a major role. Madhesis’ long-
standing grievances, aggravated by exclusion from the 
peace process, even spurred CPN(M) cadres to join in, 
despite the anti-Maoist theme of many protests.122  
B. THE RESPONSE 
The intensity and duration of the protests took the 
government by surprise. It had ignored similar demands 
by Madhesi MPs across party lines and did not negotiate 
with Madhesi groups when trouble was brewing. Instead, 
it treated the protests as a law and order problem, arresting 
leaders, imposing curfews and authorising police to shoot 
violent protestors. Many mainstream politicians were 
happy to see a militant Tarai force emerge to challenge 
the Maoists.123 Only when they themselves became targets 
and the unrest showed no signs of abating did SPA leaders 
start looking for a political solution. The Maoists dismissed 
the MJF and JTMM as criminals, claiming royalists and 
Hindu fundamentalists from India were driving the 
movement. They urged the government not to grant it 
 
 
movement consistently but sometimes missed information about 
activities in villages where there were no reporters. Crisis Group 
interview, journalist, Biratnagar, 25 May 2007. See also 
“IFJ Outraged Over Violence Against Journalists During 
Demonstrations in Nepal”, 30 January 2007, and “Journalists 
Attacked and Work Destroyed in Nepal”, 28 February 2007, 
International Federation of Journalists press releases. 
120 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, 31 May 2007. 
121 Crisis Group interview, MJF leader, June 2007. 
122 Madhesi Maoist activists not only participated but in some 
cases actively mobilised people to join the movement. One said: 
“This is what we had been fighting for all along – a Madhesi 
consciousness. I see no contradiction in being a Maoist and a 
part of the agitation”. Crisis Group interview, Maoist district 
activists, Parsa, 3 June 2007. 
123 Crisis Group interviews, NC leaders, Biratnagar and 
Rajbiraj, May 2007. 
legitimacy through negotiations and consistently argued 
that the newly prominent activists were “irresponsible” 
and lacked the “moral authority” to represent Madhesis.124 
After a week of protests, Prime Minister Koirala, in a 31 
January televised address, invited protesting groups to 
negotiations, promised to increase electoral seats in the Tarai 
and announced a commitment to federalism.125 On 2 
February, the government set up a ministerial-level talks 
team.126 However, Koirala misjudged the popular mood. 
MJF-led protestors rejected the offer and complained he did 
not empathise with their movement. Many Madhesis felt 
that the speech was high-handed and unilateral and did not 
recognise Madhesi demands as rights that were due to them. 
A week later, as the situation deteriorated further, Koirala 
made a second address, recognising the contribution of 
Madhesis to strengthening democracy, expressing regret 
over loss of life127 and promising electoral representation 
and inclusion of marginalised groups in state bodies on a 
proportional basis. 
The MJF cautiously welcomed this announcement, 
suspending its agitation for ten days to allow the 
government to implement its promises but setting 
preconditions for talks: the home minister’s resignation, 
action against those responsible for the killings and a 
judicial commission to examine the government’s 
behaviour. The JTMM(JS) conditionally agreed to talks 
but the JTMM(Goit) (then the much stronger faction) 
rejected the offer. The government prevaricated. It 
delayed amending the constitution, backed the home 
minister and did not even address uncontroversial 
demands such as compensating victims. The promised 
judicial commission – which, given the tradition of such 
enquiries in Nepal, would probably have been a painless 
way of deferring judgement on tricky issues – was only 
formed months later and dominated by establishment 
figures, including the police chief, whose own 
force’s actions are under investigation.128 There were no 
talks with the JTMM(JS).129 
 
 
124 Crisis Group interview, Prabhu Sah, MRMM, Kathmandu, 
23 May 2007. Maoists see themselves as the true representatives 
of the Madhesi people, having forcefully raised Madhesi issues 
and shed blood while fighting for them. 
125 A translation of the address was published in The Rising 
Nepal, 1 February 2007. 
126 It was headed by NC’s Mahant Thakur; the other members 
were NC(D)’s Gyanendra Bahadur Karki and UML’s Rajendra 
Pande. 
127 A translation of the address was published in The Rising 
Nepal, 8 February 2007. 
128 The cabinet formed the commission on 25 May 2007, with 
Supreme Court Justice Khilraj Regmi as its head; other members 
are the eastern regional police chief, Rabindra Pratap Shah; 
Deputy Attorney General Rajnarayan Pathak; National 
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The movement prompted mixed reactions outside the 
Tarai, including in pahadi-dominated civil society. 
Although the need for a more inclusive state is now a 
rhetorical commonplace, Madhesi militancy prompted 
fears and resentment, often reinforcing old prejudices. 
Despite concern for a backlash from other communities 
feeling threatened by Madhesi strength, most marginalised 
communities expressed support and emphasised they 
shared the demand for federalism and proportional 
representation. Civil society groups visited the troubled 
districts, agreed the agitation was mostly spontaneous and 
urged the government to address legitimate demands.130 
Media attention was finally drawn to Madhesi concerns, 
prompting some sympathetic reporting. However, much 
pahadi reaction mirrored the party response. While some 
human rights organisations accused the government of 
excessive force, some Madhesi commentators charged 
pahadi-dominated human rights groups and the media 
with bias.131 Many Kathmandu residents vociferously 
opposed the movement, believing it had been stirred up 
by “regressive elements” or was an Indian conspiracy 
to undermine Nepal’s sovereignty.132 
There was a cross-border dimension. Indian political and 
social groups, especially in Jogbani and Raxaul, organised 
camps to give shelter and medical care to the injured.133 
Many politicians were quietly supportive, with some 
border legislators making public statements in favour of 
Madhesi rights and others organising rallies on the Indian 
side.134 Some members of legislative assemblies (MLAs) 
are reported to have told district administrators not to 
 
 
Investigation Department deputy head Sukhchandra Jha and 
Siraha district court judge Sahadev Bastola. 
129 The JTMM(JS) had declared a ceasefire and set up a talks 
committee after the prime minister’s address but said the 
government did not reciprocate. Jwala Singh said: “It did not 
respond to our efforts and instead continued with their strategy 
of using force. They filed cases against our activists and did 
not try to engage with us”. Crisis Group interview, May 2007.  
130 See, for example, Citizens’ Movement for Democracy and 
Peace, press statement on goodwill visit to the Tarai, 26 January 
2007, at http://insn.org/?p=4144. 
131 Paramendra Bhagat, “The Madhesi Movement in Nepal is 
Lonely”, American Chronicle, 12 March 2007. 
132 Crisis Group interviews, Kathmandu, January-February 2007. 
133 Crisis Group interviews, Madhesi activists, Biratnagar and 
Birgunj, May 2007.  
134 Crisis Group interviews, Raxaul and Patna, June 2007. 
Sitamarhi MLA Shahid Ali Khan gave an interview to local 
FM stations in the Tarai supporting the “Madhesi struggle for 
dignity”. Anil Sinha of the Bharatiya Janata Party organised a 
protest march in Raxaul and urged the government to support 
protestors more actively.  
lean too heavily on Madhesi activists, both armed and 
unarmed.135  
Maoist-MJF tensions continued to increase and turned 
violent in Gaur on 21 March, when the MRMM 
organised a mass meeting at the same time and venue as 
the MJF. MJF activists allegedly destroyed the MRMM 
stage, provoking a similar response.136 After initially 
fleeing, MJF partisans attacked the outnumbered Maoists, 
killing 27. Some human rights activists allege that five 
women were raped and mutilated and accuse the MJF of 
hiring professional killers.137 Other assessments, including 
the UN report, say there were no rapes and blame the 
police for not enforcing order, the Maoists for 
provocation and the MJF for preparing and resorting to 
violence. Several victims were summarily executed. 
There may have been a caste component to the clash, for 
Gaur has sizeable Rajput and Yadav populations. Angry 
with the Maoists for mobilising lower castes, they used 
this as an opportunity to assert local dominance.138 The 
massacre has left the MJF with a legitimacy crisis and 
encouraged the Maoists to build a more organised 
militant force in the Tarai. 
 
 
135 Crisis Group interview, civil society activist, Janakpur, 
May 2007. There appears to be a basic protocol, and Madhesi 
leaders do not carry arms in India.  
136 “Findings of OHCHR-Nepal’s Investigations into the 21 
March killings in Gaur and Surrounding Villages”, United 
Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
April 2007, at nepal.ohchr.org/en/resources/Documents/English/ 
reports/IR/Year2007/Gaur.pdf. 
137 Interview with Mathura Shrestha, ekantipur.com, 26 
March 2007. 
138 Crisis Group interview, NSP leader, Kathmandu, May 2007. 
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V. THE CURRENT STATE OF PLAY 
A. THE LIE OF THE LAND 
When the government dragged its feet in the wake of the 
second prime ministerial announcement, the MJF resumed 
its agitation and added new demands, such as autonomy 
for the Tarai and the appointment of Madhesis as chief 
district officers in all Tarai districts.139 Madhesi support 
for a fully autonomous and unified Madhes government 
appears to have increased significantly.140 With no talks 
between the government and JTMM, options for bringing 
armed groups into the political process were closed. The 
Tarai’s political landscape became characterised by 
frequent MJF protests and strikes, Maoist-MJF clashes, 
occasional JTMM attacks on government posts and killings 
of political rivals.  
The movement threw up new forces and leaders. 
Mainstream parties can no longer rely on token Madhesi 
faces to appear inclusive. To retain support they must make 
fundamental changes in their approach. The government 
will have to address Madhesi grievances seriously, which 
means not only announcing new policies but also 
embarking on a slow, painful and complex process of 
institutional change across state institutions. The MJF is on 
the defensive after the Gaur massacre; NC and UML are 
yet to carve out a new strategy; the Maoists have lost 
support; and both JTMM factions remain underground. 
The shape of politics may be changing, with a rise in 
identity-driven allegiances (be they Madhesi vs. pahadi or 
caste- and religion-based) and most players considering 
new alliances.  
 
 
139 Observations in this section are based mainly on Crisis Group 
interviews in Morang, Dhanusha, Saptari, Siraha, Parsa, Banke 
and Kathmandu, May-June 2007; no interviews were conducted 
in far-west and west Tarai. Interviewees included representatives 
of all political parties and other organisations, including armed 
groups; government officials and security forces; journalists, 
human rights activists and civil society; Tharu and Muslim 
activists; businesspeople, trade unionists and other residents. 
140 Crisis Group interviews, May-June 2007. Across the 
eastern Tarai, support has grown for a unitary “Madhes sarkar 
[government]”. All major Madhesi political groups and 
mainstream party activists say this is the only way to gain 
control of their own political affairs and economic resources, 
and any other form of federalism would mean pahadi 
dominance. However, some intellectuals point to opposition 
within the Tarai (especially, but not exclusively, from Tharus) 
and possible economic difficulties. “I would prefer to build 
mutually beneficial integrative mechanisms with the hills than 
go it alone”, a Birgunj-based academic said. Crisis Group 
interview, Birgunj, May 2007. 
Trust deficit. The government is intensely distrusted 
throughout the Tarai. Many Madhesis are convinced it 
wants only to suppress protests, manipulate, bribe or split 
parties, distract from the real issues and craft short-term 
compromises. They feel mainstream parties encouraged 
the movement to counter the Maoists but then became 
scared of its strength and built up opponents like the 
CBES. While the government moved quickly to declare a 
murdered pahadi engineer a martyr, the lack of similar 
recognition and compensation for the dozens of Madhesi 
dead suggested to many that a pahadi’s life was worth 
more – and the home minister’s career was more 
important than Madhesis’ grievances.141 Pahadis alarmed 
by Madhesis’ confident, sometimes militant demands 
have been severely disappointed by the state’s failure to 
maintain law and order and offer a sense of security.142 
Confrontational mood. There is a general sense that 
further confrontation – in the form of a rekindled agitation 
or, more probably, sporadic violent incidents – will be hard 
to avoid. Most people are keen on constituent assembly 
elections but few believe they are likely to happen, mainly 
because they believe the major parties do not want them. 
If they occur, they will be considered meaningless if 
Madhesi issues have not been addressed. Madhesis across 
the political spectrum feel another round of agitation is 
necessary. “This is only the beginning of the struggle. We 
have woken up after so long and will not give in so easily. 
They do not want to share power and go beyond tokenism”, 
says a Madhesi activist.143 
Madhesis feel they are viewed with suspicion more than 
ever and that discrimination in the hills has increased.144 
Although most Madhesis do not want to turn the 
movement into a communal conflict, even some moderates 
now say privately that pahadis should leave the Tarai, 
even those who have lived there for generations. A civil 
society activist in Birgunj said: “They settled here as a 
 
 
141 The engineer’s name was Nabaraj Bista: “Govt declares 
Bista martyr”, nepalnews.com, 21 May 2007. Crisis Group 
interviews, Madhesi activists, Biratnagar, Rajbiraj, Lahan, 
Birgunj, Nepalgunj and Kathmandu, May-June 2007.  
142 Crisis Group interview, factory owner, Birgunj, 1 June 2007. 
Many upper and middle-class pahadis say firm government 
security action could quickly contain the Madhesi movement. 
143 Crisis Group interview, Abdul Sattar Ansari, Biratnagar, 
25 May 2007. 
144 Crisis Group interview, hotel owner, Rajbiraj, 3 June 2007. 
Also see C.K. Lal, “Playing with matches”, Nepali Times, 8 
June 2007. Crisis Group interviews, Rajbiraj and Janakpur, 
May-June 2007. Anecdotal evidence suggests Madhesis are 
increasingly being harassed in the hills. “Their insecurity has 
turned into aggressiveness in areas where they are strong. But 
pahadis should know they cannot get away with treating 
Madhesis like dirt, here or in the hills. We will give it back”, a 
bus driver said.  
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part of a systematic plan. We need to drive some of them 
out not as much to decrease the numbers as to pass on a 
strong message. The rules of the game have changed and 
they can no longer take us for granted”.145 While the general 
sentiment is that MJF missed the moment by not talking 
to the government in February, a few criticise Upendra 
Yadav for compromising prematurely; some feel that if 
they had kept on after the second prime ministerial address, 
their demands would have been fulfilled.146  
Acceptance of armed action. Although open support for 
armed action remains limited, many moderates quietly 
condone it, arguing it is an understandable last resort 
when all other means of being heard have failed. Most 
Madhesis see both JTMM factions as retaining a political 
core but dismiss other armed groups as criminals.147 A 
Janakpur-based civil society activist said: “I don’t support 
violence but I can understand why they’re doing it. They 
have played an important role. If it was not for them, the 
government would have suppressed the movement long 
back”.148 Many still view the armed groups positively for 
standing up to the Maoists and breaking their culture of 
fear. At the same time, they point to Maoist “success” as 
paving the way for the groups’ rise and acceptance.149  
Constant communication with the mainstream means the 
armed groups are not beyond the pale. Moderates worry 
that a resort to arms could degenerate into violence for 
its own sake and criminality, which would increase 
Madhesis’ problems by encouraging the government to 
crack down, but still feel that “yah hamare pahalwan 
hain” (“these are our fighters”).150 Even NC activists 
admit there is a degree of sympathy for armed groups.151 
Radicalisation is not yet irreversible but the space for 
moderation is being squeezed.  
 
 
145 Crisis Group interview, 1 June 2007. 
146 Crisis Group interview, MJF sympathisers, Rajbiraj and 
Lahan, May-June 2007. 
147 Crisis Group interviews, May-June 2007. There is concern 
about JTMM criminal activities and members’ lack of political 
training but leaders (especially Goit, who is often referred to by 
the respectful term netaji) tend to be seen as following a more or 
less coherent political agenda. 
148 Crisis Group interview, 29 May 2007. 
149 Crisis Group interviews, Biratnagar, Janakpur, Rajbiraj and 
Nepalgunj, May-June 2007. Armed group leaders, sympathisers 
and non-violent moderates all say the Maoist example has been 
the main spur for Madhesi militants. An analyst said: “The 
general feeling is that if the Maoists can get 83 MPs and five 
ministers through the sheer power of the gun, what is wrong if 
other groups with more genuine causes take the armed route?”  
150 Crisis Group interviews, NSP leaders, Kathmandu and 
Rajbiraj, May 2007. 
151 Crisis Group interview, NC leader, Janakpur, July 2007. 
Caste politics. Caste has always been a feature of politics 
in the Tarai and elsewhere. However, most politicians and 
observers assume it will play a growing role in shaping 
future voting patterns. It is already a feature of agitation 
politics but fault lines have been partly suppressed by 
shared interests in countering pahadi domination. In the 
MRMM, MJF and JTMM(G), the predominance of Yadav 
leaders has bred resentment, especially among non-Yadav 
intermediate and lower castes who feel relatively more 
alienated from the movement. JTMM(JS) includes a large 
number of Dalits and Brahmans. “People relate to party 
leaders of their own caste. It’s natural for Yadavs to 
dominate given the large size of their community”, says 
an MJF leader.152 Many Brahmans worry that proportional 
representation will weaken them if it means guaranteed 
votes for other, numerically superior, castes. Caste loyalties 
can trump party loyalties.153  
B. THE ESTABLISHMENT: SHAKEN, NOT 
STIRRED  
The movement forced the political class, civil society and 
the international community to pay attention to Madhesi 
grievances. Mainstream actors, including the Maoists, 
could have used this opportunity to make the peace process 
more inclusive by fulfilling some minimum preconditions 
laid down by agitating groups and creating an open 
environment for talks. Instead, the eight parties calculated 
that conceding some substantive demands unilaterally 
could obviate the need for negotiations. Koirala’s second 
address aimed to defuse the situation and undercut the 
Madhesi agenda but Madhesi groups claimed the parties 
were not sincere about a negotiated settlement and resumed 
agitation.154 Continuing protests, international pressure and 
stalemate in March and April forced a rethink and more 
openness to talks but underlying attitudes have hardly 
shifted. 
1. The NC and UML 
Party leaders have realised that Madhesi identity politics 
are here to stay but lack a coherent message and are 
unwilling to address real issues of inclusion. Although they 
have organised mass rallies in some Tarai towns, their 
district units have been inactive, failing even to 
communicate achievements. Party leaders have not been 
 
 
152 Crisis Group interview, Biratnagar, 25 May 2007. 
153 Crisis Group interviews, Brahman leaders, Kathmandu and 
Rajbiraj, May 2007. One activist said he might campaign for 
his party but vote for someone of his own caste, even if from 
another party. Crisis Group interview, Janakpur, 29 May 2007. 
154 Crisis Group interview, Upendra Yadav, Birgunj, 28 May 
2007. 
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listening to their own Madhesi colleagues.155 The 
emergence of new political actors threatens their support 
base: Madhesi central- and district-level leaders are yet to 
leave in significant numbers but discontent is brewing; they 
know their parties will lose out if they do not articulate 
Madhesi concerns.156 NC and UML activists participated 
in the Madhesi movement; their parties reined them in only 
after Koirala’s second address.157 
Still, Madhesi activists now have greater bargaining power 
and better prospects for promotion. “If the party leaders 
don’t listen to us, we will move on to other groups and 
they will lose out. The days of imposing a pahadi agenda 
are gone”, an NC activist said.158 Dealing with assertive 
identity politics requires new political strategies, for 
example, promoting local and national Madhesi leaders, 
offering a regional agenda and explaining why, despite 
being in power for so long, the bigger parties did not 
address Madhesi grievances. Unless the established parties 
innovate, politics may follow the pattern of neighbouring 
Indian states, whose experience suggests that national 
parties find it hard to cater to identity-based aspirations 
and lose ground to local groups.159 
2. The NSP(A) 
The NSP(A) organised protests after the interim 
constitution was drafted but was unwilling to give up the 
perks of power. In retrospect, some party leaders believe 
that if they had quit the government and adopted a more 
radical stance, the MJF might not have emerged as a 
power.160 Party leaders said they supported the movement 
but would work for change from within, pressing other 
 
 
155 District-level Madhesi activists had warned that the interim 
constitution needed revisions. Crisis Group interviews, Rajbiraj, 
27 May 2007. NC(D)’s Bijay Kumar Gachhedar, for example, 
made a speech in the first sitting of the interim legislature 
articulating Madhesi objections. 
156 NC activists say it is largely leftists who have joined the 
JTMM and MJF (although a few NC members have joined the 
latter); they feel less threatened by possible defections. Crisis 
Group interviews, Rajbiraj and Biratnagar, May 2007. 
157 Crisis Group interview, NC leader, Biratnagar, 25 May 2007.  
158 Crisis Group interview, NC district committee member, 
Rajbiraj, 27 May 2007. 
159 All of India’s major national parties have suffered from the 
rise of regional, ethnic and caste-based parties that have eaten 
into their former support bases. See Kanchan Chandra, Why 
Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and ethnic head counts in 
India (Cambridge, 2004) and Zoya Hasan, Parties and Party 
Politics (Delhi, 2004). 
160 On perks of power, Crisis Group interview, NSP central 
leader, Kathmandu, May 2007. NSP district leaders say the rift 
between the two main central leaders, Rajendra Mahato and 
Hridayesh Tripathi, was responsible for failure to seize the 
moment. Crisis Group interview, NSP leader, Janakpur, May 
2007. 
parties to accept demands. When the government did not 
respond, the sole NSP(A) minister, Hridayesh Tripathi, 
resigned on 29 January. 
The NSP(A) is unclear about the implications of the rise 
of MJF and Madhesi identity politics and the nature of 
other groups. While some leaders claim that other Madhesi 
leaders are criminals who should be fought, most feel the 
emergence of other groups, including armed ones, will 
benefit the Madhesi cause by forcing the government to 
pay attention.161 Newer Madhesi parties may not harm the 
NSP(A)’s electoral base, given that though it has won less 
than 15 per cent of the Madhesi votes in past elections, it 
has a loyal constituency.162 The assertion of Madhesi 
consciousness may in fact provide an opportunity for the 
NSP(A) to expand its base in the absence of other strong 
Madhesi parties. For this, leaders realised they needed to 
consolidate the party organisation and expedited the 
reunification of both factions.163 Party leaders plan a two-
pronged electoral strategy. In the wake of the radicalisation 
of political discussions, some leaders will adopt more 
hardline slogans.164 At the same time, NSP(A) will play 
up its image as a responsible party which has stuck to the 
Madhesi cause without creating communal disharmony. 
“We are the party that raises Madhesi issues, yet is 
committed to protecting pahadis in the Madhes and the 
Madhesis in the hills”, said an NSP(A) leader. 165 
3. The Maoists 
The Maoists’ public image took a severe battering during 
the movement, largely due to their own mistakes, and they 
have continued to be damaged by disputes over control of 
Madhes policy. They resisted Madhesi demands even 
 
 
161 Crisis Group interview, Babunandan Yadav, NSP Morang 
district president, Biratnagar, 25 May 2007. Yadav sees other 
Madhesi groups as the biggest enemies of the Madhesi cause 
and warns their actions will create a backlash against Madhesis 
in the hills. He welcomed the deployment of the Armed Police 
Force on the border as a counter to criminals in armed groups. 
Others, however, welcomed the rise of armed groups as a sign 
of Madhesi consciousness. Crisis Group interviews, NSP 
members, Kathmandu and Rajbiraj, May 2007.  
162 Crisis Group interview, NSP leaders, Kathmandu, May 
2007. NSP leaders realise they generally win few Madhesi 
votes. Even if they do not gain from the present mobilisation, 
other Madhesi groups or candidates will win – at least an 
improvement on pahadi domination. 
163 NSP(A) and NSP reunified in June 2007 under the 
leadership of Anandi Devi. The party kept the NSP(A) name; 
its declared aim is a federal democratic republic. 
164 NSP(A) minister Rajendra Mahato asserted that only 
Madhesis have the right to rule in Madhes. “Minister Mahato’s 
remarks spark protests”, nepalnews.com, 13 May 2007. 
165 Crisis Group interview, Anil Jha, NSP central committee 
member, Kathmandu, May 2007.  
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though many were in line with their own longstanding 
policies and refused to engage with protesting groups. 
They were on the defensive since their action in Lahan 
and misjudged the popularity of Madhesi groups.166 Their 
insistence that they were the first to raise key Madhesi 
demands and their frustration with newer groups hijacking 
their agenda left them looking like bad losers, even among 
their supporters. “There is no point in complaining”, 
observed a Maoist-nominated MP. “This happens in 
democratic politics, and the Maoists need to get used to 
it”.167 Nevertheless, the Maoists have shown restraint in 
not retaliating violently despite the killing of more than 
four dozen of their cadres in Gaur and other incidents. The 
recent pattern of targeted assassinations of mid-level 
Maoist leaders in the Tarai runs a direct risk of inciting a 
heavy response. 
The problem was not so much that people had forgotten 
their championing of these issues but that they failed to 
deliver. In the words of an MJF sympathiser, “the Maoists 
contributed to the militant mood in the Madhes. They 
sowed the crop but lost out when the time came to reap the 
harvest. They armed us with new consciousness but then 
the bullet turned on them”.168 Maoist leaders claim they 
had merely left these issues for the constituent assembly 
because of the need for compromise on the interim 
constitution.169 Madhesi activists do not buy this. “Why 
is it that the Maoists are so easily willing to compromise 
and give in on Madhesi issues, while remaining steadfast 
on other things that concern them? This shows the real 
motive of the pahadi leadership”.170 
The Maoists also suffered from the fact that disparate 
groups – from the SPA to the MJF and JTMM and India 
– were keen to use the genuine disillusionment felt 
towards them to weaken them.171 Many in the Tarai 
 
 
166 Crisis Group interview, Maoist leader, Birgunj, May 2007. 
Maoist activists admit they underestimated Upendra Yadav as 
well as both factions of JTMM. 
167 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, April 2007. 
168 Crisis Group interview, Birgunj, 1 June 2007. 
169 Crisis Group interview, Athak, CPN(M) Banke district in-
charge, Nepalgunj, 15 June 2007.  
170 Crisis Group interview, human rights activist and former 
Maoist sympathiser, Nepalgunj, 12 June 2007. 
171 For the SPA, Crisis Group interviews, NC activists, 
Biratnagar and Rajbiraj, May 2007. The Tarai has been a 
Congress bastion, and the party was keen to weaken its rival. 
The UML will be competing with the Maoists for the same 
leftist votes. Given that the Maoists had won over some 
segments of marginalised Tarai communities, it benefited UML 
to erode their support. For the MJF, Crisis Group interviews, 
party activists, Kathmandu, Biratnagar, Janakpur, Nepalgunj, 
May-June 2007. In view of their past antagonism and the fact 
that their substantive demands are similar, MJF views the 
Maoists as their primary competitors. This is coupled with 
and India consider the movement and subsequent 
protests to be directed as much against the Maoists as 
the state.172 There are frequent references to the struggle 
between Madhesis and Maoists. The Maoists clearly 
failed to counter the widespread perception that they 
were responsible for Madhesis not getting rights.173 
Leaders admit this has eroded the party’s support and 
credibility in the Tarai.174 Organisational strength has 
dropped, with some members defecting to JTMM 
factions and MJF. 175  
Some Madhesi activists within the party are also upset with 
its leader, Prachanda, for advocating strong-arm measures 
against other groups.176 “This puts us in a difficult spot. It 
is impossible to defend that kind of stand at the ground 
level. We will vote for our own party but will also support 
pro-Madhesi activities of all other outfits as well”, an 
activist said.177 Internal leadership tensions within the 
Madhes came to a head in June 2007, when the CPN(M) 
central secretariat took direct control of activities in the 
Tarai, sidelining the MRMM.178 
The weakening of the Maoists, however, needs to be seen 
in perspective. They were never as strong in the Tarai as 
 
 
intense personal bitterness between activists. Most members of 
the JTMM are reportedly former Maoists who left because they 
were disillusioned with their attitude on the Madhes issue or 
because of personal enmity. They seized the chance to wrong-
foot the Maoists. On India, Crisis Group interviews, 
government officials and analysts, Patna and Delhi, June 2007. 
The general impression in India is that Madhesi groups have 
been a welcome counter-force to the Maoists. 
172 For the Tarai, Crisis Group interviews, Madhesi activists, 
Biratnagar, Rajbiraj and Janakpur, May 2007. For India, Crisis 
Group interviews, government officials and analysts, Patna 
and Delhi, June 2007. 
173 “We have not been able to explain our policies. There is 
fear and anger and a question mark on our agenda and 
commitment”. Crisis Group interview, Prabhu Sah, MRMM 
general secretary, Kathmandu, May 2007. 
174 Crisis Group interviews, Maoist leaders, Kathmandu, 
Birgunj and Nepalgunj, May-June 2007. 
175 Crisis Group interview, Maoist trade union leader, Birgunj, 
June 2007. The activist says that in his village in Parsa district, 
the MJF and the Maoists have about 800 members each, with 
MJF’s strength increasing steadily. Both factions of the JTMM 
have about 60 members each, mostly ex-Maoists. 
176 Prachanda has advocated strong police action against 
Madhesi groups. See “Aba ekaisaum shatabdiko naulo 
janabidroh hunechha”, Janadesh, 20 March 2007. 
177 Crisis Group interview, Maoist trade union leader, Birgunj, 
June 2007. 
178 “Madhes banda sthagit”, Janadesh, 19 June 2007. The 
MRMM central committee was dissolved and Maoist MP Ram 
Kumari Yadav was appointed coordinator of a new ad-hoc 
committee formed in its place. “Maoist Madhesi Front central 
body dissolved over appointment row”, ekantipur.com, 22 June 
2007. 
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made out to be. Their strategy to mobilise lower castes 
antagonised several powerful sections; talk of revolutionary 
land reform scared the mid-sized land owners, who felt 
their only asset would be lost; the use of intimidation 
alienated many; the presence of pahadis as party leaders in 
the Tarai led to suspicions about their commitment; and 
the leadership was never united – several key members 
quit the party.179 Fear has diminished with their entry into 
a more open, competitive political system, making people 
more confident to express these grievances.  
Yet, it would be naïve to write off the Maoists. They are 
well organised; have trained and articulate party leaders 
who can communicate persuasively; retain support among 
very marginalised communities;180 and have clear policies 
which place Madhesi issues within a broader framework.181 
They are trying to rebuild support and explain their stand 
by organising mass rallies in Tarai towns. They adopted a 
multi-pronged strategy, which includes emphasising MJF 
links with royalists and Hindu fundamentalists, claiming 
credit for raising Madhesi issues early, encouraging other 
communities like Tharus in the west, Kochilas in the east 
and Dalits to assert their identity, publicly apologising for 
the Lahan incident, targeting deprived Madhesis by 
increasing focus on land reform and seeking sympathy by 
pointing to the Gaur massacre.182 They announced a 
month-long “people’s war”-styled protest in the Tarai in 
June 2007 but dropped it amid an acrimonious clash that 
saw the MRMM cut out of decision-making.183 In the 
wake of this embarrassment, it is not clear if there is yet a 
revised concept. 
C. REBELS WITHOUT A ROADMAP? 
The reluctance of the government to initiate negotiations 
explains only part of the problem. Madhesi groups 
themselves face internal tensions and lack of clarity on 
immediate demands and long-term strategy. 
1. The MJF and other Madhesi leadership 
The movement left the MJF as a leading force: it had 
mobilised people and changed national political dynamics. 
But translating this into lasting political advantages 
 
 
179 Crisis Group interview, Chandrakishore, director, Centre 
for Social Research, Birgunj, 1 June 2007.  
180 C.K. Lal, “Playing with matches”, Nepali Times, 8 June 
2007. 
181 Crisis Group interview, Prabhu Sah, Kathmandu, 23 May 
2007. 
182 Crisis Group interview, Chandrakishore, 1 June 2007.  
183 The CPN(M)’s 15 June central secretariat meeting 
decided to launch a “strong struggle” in the Tarai but 
withdrew the MRMM’s scheduled bandh. “Madhes banda 
sthagit”, Janadesh, 19 June 2007. 
will be difficult, and its leaders differ over strategies of 
confrontation or accommodation.184 Following the prime 
minister’s second address, some had wanted to push their 
demands, believing the movement still had momentum.185 
Others felt the time was ripe for dialogue, and there would 
be little support for renewed agitation. The leadership 
hedged its bets by “cautiously welcoming” the address 
but imposing preconditions for talks.186 In hindsight, MJF 
leaders admit they were mistaken.187 Public sympathy 
dipped, and there was no focus for recruitment and 
organisation-building; the MJF was criticised for 
misjudging its agenda.188 Efforts to claim sole credit for 
the movement alienated non-MJF activists.189 
The MJF’s suspected links with royalists and Hindu 
fundamentalists in India have raised suspicions in the Tarai 
about its true agenda, especially among left activists and 
Muslims.190 Upendra Yadav has also faced criticism for 
promoting people of his own caste.191 The Gaur massacre 
was a greater challenge. Some leaders believe the incident 
bolstered their anti-Maoist credentials, privately take pride 
in having “taught the Maoists a lesson” and resisted calls 
to apologise.192 But the incident brought national and 
international censure, restricted activists’ movements, left 
top leaders scared for their physical security and weakened 
 
 
184 Crisis Group interview, MJF central committee member, 
Kathmandu, 23 May 2007.  
185 Crisis Group interviews, MJF leaders, Biratnagar and Lahan, 
May 2007. 
186 Crisis Group interview, MJF central leaders, Kathmandu 
and Birgunj, May 2007. 
187 Crisis Group interviews, MJF central and district leaders 
and sympathisers, Kathmandu, Birgunj, Nepalgunj and 
Rajbiraj, May-June 2007.  
188 For example, critics say it should not have insisted on Home 
Minister Sitaula’s resignation as a precondition when it could 
have pushed for substantive progress. Crisis Group interview, 
Madhesi political activists, Kathmandu and Biratnagar, May 
2007. 
189 Crisis Group interview, NC and NC(D) activists, Biratnagar 
and Janakpur, May 2007; journalists and civil society members, 
Birgunj and Janakpur, May 2007. 
190 “We support the Madhesi cause but are confused when we 
hear about MJF’s links with Hindu extremist organisations 
like the RSS. The MJF must come clean on this”. Crisis Group 
interview, Mohammadi Siddiqui, civil society activist, Nepalgunj, 
12 June 2007. 
191 Some key MJF district leaders in eastern Tarai and a 
disproportionate number of central committee members are 
Yadavs. 
192 An MJF-appointed commission exonerated it for the Gaur 
incident, blaming the Maoists and the local administration. A 
MJF leader present at Gaur said: “The Maoists had it coming. 
They disrupted our rallies in other towns and provoked us in 
Gaur. The backlash was inevitable and necessary and shows 
only we can counter them effectively”. Crisis Group interview, 
May 2007. 
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MJF bargaining capacity. Upendra Yadav had to flee to 
India, where it appears he was advised to halt all violent 
activities and immediately start talking with the government 
and participate in the broader process.193 
The decision to register as a political party has raised 
its own problems. As a cross-party forum, the MJF could 
draw broad support but sympathisers with existing 
affiliations will think hard before jumping ship to join the 
new party.194 Yadav argues the decision is still well 
founded: “A political party is essential to run a sustained 
movement, institutionalise its gains, solve problems and 
address issues. We are ready to bear short-term costs but 
the MJF as a political party is a historic necessity”.195 The 
MJF also started talks with the government, privately and 
then officially, without its preconditions being met.196 
Party leaders argue they retain their demands but are 
talking so as not to appear obstructive.197 Some activists, 
however, accuse them of inconsistency and weakness.198 
The MJF retains political strengths. It has won widespread 
recognition as the main champion of Madhesi rights (even 
many who disagree with its tactics accept it has pushed the 
Madhesi issue onto the agenda in a way the NSP failed to 
do for two decades);199 it has flexed its muscles with strikes 
that can close down the eastern Tarai and hurt Kathmandu; 
its leaders have extensive links in India and can still gain 
from presenting themselves as the only effective counter 
to the Maoists. Yet, there are questions over its political 
 
 
193 Crisis Group interviews, analysts, Kathmandu and Birgunj, 
May-June 2007. 
194 “We had hoped MJF could be a training ground for Madhesi 
activists and a broader ideological school. It is just another 
political party now”. Crisis Group interview, NC(D) activist, 
Biratnagar, 24 May 2007. 
195 Crisis Group interview, Upendra Yadav, Birgunj, 28 May 
2007.  
196 Minister for Peace and Reconstruction Ram Chandra Poudel 
met Upendra Yadav in Birgunj in May 2007, paving the way 
for formal government-MJF talks in Janakpur in June. 
197 On the home minister’s resignation, Upendra Yadav 
explained: “In the larger interest and for the sake of going 
forward, we have shown flexibility. But the entire episode 
reveals how the home minister sticking to his post is more 
important for the ruling class than the sentiments of all 
Madhesis”. Crisis Group interview, Birgunj, 28 May 2007. 
198 Crisis Group interviews, journalists and activists, Birgunj, 
Janakpur and Rajbiraj, May 2007. One MJF leader responded: 
“We have done what everyone was urging us to do: drop our 
insistence and start talking. But now the same people are turning 
back and saying that we have deserted the cause. That is unfair 
and no one can blame us. It is now up to the government”. 
Crisis Group interview, Janakpur, 20 May 2007. 
199 Some believe it has a strong connection with villagers who 
view it as a “Madhesi force”, but even if true it probably lacks the 
organisation to leverage rural support. Crisis Group interview, 
Atma Ram Sah, civil society activist, Birgunj, 1 June 2007. 
judgement and planning. Madhesi politicians are not 
rushing to join, and some feel it has missed its moment.200 
It may be displaced by other forces now that it has put the 
issue on the agenda. As a close observer puts it, “there are 
many people who think the MJF has done a great job but 
will be happy to see the torch now handed on to other 
parties”.201 
Madhesi parliamentarians have been active within their 
own parties and in giving more coordinated support to the 
Madhesi agenda. An informal 26-member, cross-party 
alliance rejected the proposal of the Electoral Constituency 
Delimitation Commission (ECDC) and called for a new 
delineation of constituencies. Breaking with their own 
parties, they blocked the functioning of the interim 
legislature for more than a month.202 The group is led by 
NC(D)’s Bijay Gachhedar and Jai Prakash Prasad Gupta, 
NSP(A)’s Hridayesh Tripathi and UML’s Mahendra 
Yadav; some have considered forming a common Madhesi 
party. They see association with national parties as a liability 
when people are demanding radical change, and the political 
vacuum leaves space for another force.203 But unity will 
be difficult because of differences on leadership and a 
long-term strategy. Other challenges would include building 
an organisation and explaining why they had not raised 
the Madhesi issue until now.204 
2. The JTMM 
Both factions participated in the Madhesi movement and 
had activists shot by police.205 In the post-movement 
vacuum, the armed groups have gained strength; their 
organisational base and activities have increased, and they 
have even gained a level of acceptability in some Madhesi 
intellectual circles. Goit and Jwala are underground and 
live mostly in Bihar but are in close contact with other 
Madhesi leaders, give occasional interviews and travel in 
Tarai districts. Both factions are comfortable with using 
violence: abductions – primarily of pahadis but increasingly 
of Madhesis as well;206 stealing property and confiscating 
 
 
200 “Unless we have faith in the political instincts of the MJF 
leaders, how can we jump ship and leave an established party?” 
Crisis Group interview, NC activists, Rajbiraj, 27 May 2007. 
201 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, 22 June 2007. 
202 Bhojraj Bhat, “Avrudh gati”, Nepal, 27 May 2007. 
203 Crisis Group interviews, Madhesi politicians, Biratnagar, 
Rajbiraj and Janakpur, May 2007. Activists are pressuring 
leaders to come together. 
204 As an analyst put it, “these MPs are trying to be radical now 
after others have done the ground work and put Madhes on the 
agenda. People can see through this new-found radicalism”. 
Crisis Group interview, Birgunj, 1 June 2007.  
205 Crisis Group interview, JTMM sympathisers, Janakpur, 29 
May 2007.  
206 Pahadis have sometimes been targeted as representatives of 
the state (district administration officials have been particularly 
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land, mostly from pahadis but also from Madhesis;207 
attacking government posts and carrying out bombings; 
and threatening pahadi administrators.208 
Jwala Singh’s faction has expanded rapidly209 and appears 
stronger in numbers and activities. JTMM(JS) is willing to 
begin talks with the government if certain preconditions 
are met: declaring killed party activists martyrs, a ceasefire 
and withdrawal of cases against JTMM members. This 
may stem from the need to win recognition as a legitimate 
political actor. Singh believes Madhesi politics requires a 
loose alliance of all groups and calls Goit the key obstacle 
to forging such unity.210 Goit has publicly expressed his 
willingness to talk in the past but the government did not 
respond actively. Goit feels let down and is reluctant to 
commit himself to sustained dialogue.211 However, he 
says he is not against negotiations and will come on board 
if the Maoists withdraw their publicly declared war against 
JTMM(G) and the government assures him of full security 
and creates the proper environment by reaching out to 
Madhesis.212  
JTMM(JS) has emerged as the preferred alternative for 
non-Yadav castes in the armed movement and can create 
disturbances in eastern Tarai districts. Jwala Singh is the 
younger and more energetic of the two leaders but knows 
his limitations and that he must compromise ultimately. He 
is perceived to lack political maturity, has very few senior 
advisers and has limited links in Kathmandu, which 
restricts his access to information and ability to play groups 
against one another. He also does not command much 
support in Madhesi civil society or intelligentsia. Many 
recruits do not have adequate political training and are 
believed to come from criminal backgrounds. JTMM 
sympathisers argue it is necessary to rely on all kinds 
of people in an armed movement but insist that the 
organisation retains a political core.213  
 
 
vulnerable) and Madhesis for extortion, but the division is not 
clear-cut. 
207 For example, JTMM(JS) took over land owned by NC 
leader Ram Baran Yadav in Dhanusha and poet Siddhicharan 
Shrestha in Siraha. “Andolanko adma aparadh”, Himal 
Khabarpatrika, 30 May 2007. 
208 For example, see JTMM(JS) press statement, 14 April 2007. 
209 Crisis Group interview, Jwala Singh, May 2007. Singh 
claims by early July 2007 he will have a presence in all Tarai 
districts.  
210 Ibid. 
211 Crisis Group interview, JTMM(G) sympathiser, Kathmandu, 
June 2007. 
212 Crisis Group interview, Jai Krishna Goit, June 2007.  
213 “Intellectuals do not join armed groups. You need footsoldiers 
who are comfortable with weapons and can communicate a 
message persuasively”. Crisis Group interviews, JTMM 
sympathisers, Rajbiraj and Janakpur, May 2007. 
Goit’s activities are similar but more limited. He appears 
less compromising on independence, telling several 
interlocutors this is his final political battle, and he will not 
relent. But he realises this may not be feasible in the short 
term and says he is laying out the theoretical foundations 
for future generations to take the struggle forward.214 
JTMM(G) has suffered because of internal tensions and 
its leader’s frail health. Goit’s real advantage, however, 
lies in his reputation as a committed political activist. He 
commands respect in Madhesi civil society and among 
political activists of all hues and his activists are seen as 
more politically inclined than those of JTMM(JS). That 
JTMM(G) has been relatively more restrained in its 
violence may reflect either limited strength or a calculated 
attempt to be seen as more responsible.  
 
 
214 Crisis Group interview, Jai Krishna Goit, June 2007.  
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VI. INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS 
A. CROSS-BORDER CONNECTIONS 
In an unsettled neighbourhood, New Delhi does not want 
to add hostile relations with Kathmandu to a lengthy list 
of headaches.215 “We already have strained ties with 
Pakistan and China and do not get along too well with 
Bangladesh. The relationship with Sri Lanka is complex 
because of the civil war and its implications for us. Nepal 
can be India’s true diplomatic success in the region”, said 
an Indian analyst.216 Yet, expertise on Nepal and 
sustained attention to its politics is hard to come by, not 
only in Delhi but even in the capitals of bordering states 
which have very direct interests.217 Nevertheless, India is 
concerned about instability and has supported the peace 
process. Key security concerns include what policy-
makers see as the rising influence of Pakistani intelligence 
agencies, the increase in madrasas in the Tarai, links 
between Maoists and Indian Naxalites, large-scale cross-
border crime and possible Chinese intervention.218  
Although almost all Indian politicians and diplomats 
preface remarks by emphasising that they do not dabble 
in foreign politics, many Indians do not see the Tarai as 
“foreign”.219 A degree of cross-border political 
involvement is considered perfectly natural. There is 
 
 
215 The analysis of Indian attitudes in this section is primarily 
based on Crisis Group interviews in Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and 
New Delhi in May-June 2007. Interviewees included 
representatives of most major Indian political parties, bureaucrats, 
police officers, journalists, civil society activists, serving and 
retired diplomats. One interviewee was of Indian pahadi origin. 
216 Crisis Group interview, Delhi, 7 June 2007. 
217 A senior Lucknow police official said: “Nepal occupies very 
little space in the minds of policy-makers here”. This view was 
reiterated in Bihar, though interest in Patna is slightly higher. Two 
senior home ministry officials of the Bihar government track 
developments in Nepal, especially if major events take place close 
to the border. There is negligible interest among either national or 
state-level journalists; no prominent Indian media has covered the 
Madhes agitation extensively, though local editions from border 
towns publish Nepal news. There is little public discussion of 
Nepal politics and minimal civil society interest. Crisis Group 
interviews, Patna and Lucknow, June 2007.  
218 Crisis Group interviews, government officials, Patna and 
Lucknow, May-June 2007. 
219 This is especially true of the Hindu extremist organisations, 
which include Nepal in their vision of a “greater India” 
(Akhand Bharat). But it also applies to others, including 
government officials, some left-leaning politicians and civil 
society activists. A Lucknow police official said: “We are all 
one. Nepalis are our people”. A civil society activist admitted: 
“For most Indians, Nepal is not a separate country, and it takes 
time to register that it is independent.” Crisis Group 
interviews, Raxaul, Patna and Lucknow, June 2007. 
widespread sympathy for the Madhesi cause, and most 
politicians and bureaucrats do not hesitate to express 
“moral support”.220 Such feelings are especially intense 
in the border areas, which are more familiar with the 
situation. “We know exactly what Madhesis go through 
in Nepal because we experience the same treatment 
when we visit Nepal ourselves”, observed a Raxaul-
based journalist.221 
There are common features to the outlook of many India 
interest groups, from government and political parties to 
journalists and academics. Most (like pahadi Nepalis) see 
Madhesis as basically Indian or of Indian origin. In Patna, 
a senior bureaucrat constantly referred to Madhesis as 
Biharis and of Bihari origin and was surprised to know 
there was more to it than that.222 Many politicians talked 
about Madhesis “as our own people who settled in Nepal”. 
Even academics saw Madhesis in the same vein and 
wondered about the absence of a sub-national Bihari 
consciousness.223 Despite a generally supportive outlook, 
most Indians (apart from those living near the border) have 
little sense of the detail of Madhesi demands. Those who 
take an interest generally say they will be happy if demands 
are addressed but stress that Madhesis have to shape and 
lead their movement themselves. There is no obvious 
support for Madhesi independence among either officials 
or the wider population.224 
There is awareness among officials that serious unrest 
would not be good for India but agitation like that of 
January-February 2007 has little direct impact, except the 
very local level where strikes and shutdowns affect border 
residents. Most people are still more concerned about 
Maoist influence; there is a widespread sense that the 
Madhesi movement was primarily anti-Maoist and usefully 
set the former insurgents back. No one interviewed 
mentioned the risks for mainstream parties. While some, 
 
 
220 Crisis Group interviews, Raxaul, Patna and Delhi, June 
2007. Individual leaders from the Hindu nationalist BJP to 
the centrist Janata Dal (United) and Samajwadi Party and the 
above-ground Naxalite Communist Party of India (Marxist-
Leninist) expressed support for the Madhesi cause. 
221 Crisis Group interview, Bijay Giri, Dainik Jagaran bureau 
chief, Raxaul, 1 June 2007. Giri said Nepali security forces 
attacked him while he was covering the Madhesi movement, 
smashing his camera and abusing him for supporting the 
movement by reporting on it. 
222 Crisis Group interview, Patna, 5 June 2007. 
223 Crisis Group interviews, Patna, 4-5 June 2007. 
224 Crisis Group interviews, Patna and Delhi, June 2007. Even 
sympathetic politicians made it clear Indian parties would not 
support a Madhesi movement request for independence. Some 
BJP politicians may have silently encouraged some Madhesi 
groups to radicalise their demands but there is no support for 
independence among mainstream Indian parties, security 
agencies and bureaucrats.  
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especially on the right, worry about Chinese interference, 
concerns about the UN role in the Tarai or increased U.S. 
involvement are very limited and attract almost no attention 
in the mainstream press.225 
There is little expertise on Madhesi issues in either New 
Delhi or any of the bordering states.226 Many Indian 
politicians explicitly compare Nepal’s recent upheavals 
to India’s struggle for independence.227 They assume that 
Nepali politics will gradually take on Indian-style features 
– possibly republican, most likely secular, with an 
increased focus on caste-oriented vote banks, a natural 
process of different groups agitating for greater 
representation and a system flexible enough to 
accommodate them.228 A sense that Nepal is very similar 
to India and its politics can be understood in similar terms 
may partly explain Indians’ generally relaxed view of the 
risks posed by unrest in the Tarai. 
The open border. Nepali and Indian citizens cross the 
1,753km open border without formal identification and, 
at least in theory, enjoy the same employment rights.229 
There are longstanding traditions of seasonal migration 
from Nepal to find work in the agricultural off-season, 
some economic migration in the other direction and 
 
 
225 Crisis Group interview, former senior government official, 
Delhi, June 2007. He said: “The U.S. or UN cannot do anything 
in Nepal without us. When we have a clear thought, we can go 
ahead, and they cannot stop us. The UN is helping our cause right 
now, and we do not need to worry”. Indian concerns on the Tarai 
and other cross-border interests rarely feature in the Indian press.  
226 While a few analysts and journalists in New Delhi track 
Nepal closely, there is no expert on Madhesi issues. Seminar 
organisers have difficulty finding speakers on Tarai politics 
and have to rely on part-time journalists from the region. 
227 Crisis Group interviews, Bihar MLA, Patna, and Communist 
Party of India leader, Lucknow, June 2007. 
228 India itself has gone through many reconfigurations, from 
the 1955 States Reorganisation Commission, which redelineated 
it along linguistic lines, to the creation of Uttaranchal, Jharkhand 
and Chhattisgarh largely on ethnic lines in 2000. India also 
experiences frequent struggles, sometimes violent, over quotas 
and occasional identity-based outbursts such as the June 2007 
Gujjar agitation that shut down parts of New Delhi. 
229 The 1950 Indo-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship (Arts. 
6 and 7) grants citizens of each country reciprocal rights to carry 
out industrial, economic and commercial activities and in matters 
of residence, ownership of property and movement. The text is 
at www.nepaldemocracy.org/documents/treaties_agreements/ 
indo-nepal_treaty_peace.htm. Useful coverage of cross-border 
relations can be found in Hari Bansh Jha (ed.), Nepal-India 
Border Relations (Kathmandu, 1995); Hari Bansh Jha (ed.), 
Duty-Free Border Trade and Special Economic Zone between 
Nepal and India (Kathmandu, 1995); and C.K. Lal, “Cultural 
flows across a blurred boundary”, in Kanak Mani Dixit and 
Shastri Ramachandran (eds.), State of Nepal (Kathmandu, 2002), 
pp. 100-118. 
settlement, both in neighbouring areas and further afield.230 
Many Madhesis say the border is in any case “artificial”.231 
Despite occasional tensions, it has only rarely been 
sealed.232 Customs posts control goods, and security 
forces, especially Indian, have bases and use patrols to 
monitor people but this has not affected cross-border 
dynamics.233 
Family links. There are strong family and kinship ties 
across the border, with overlapping religious, linguistic 
and social structures – a roti-beti (bread and daughters) 
relationship in which mutual dependence can be seen in 
economic and marital ties. A Biratnagar-based Madhesi 
said: “This border means little to me. My wife’s family is 
in Jogbani in Bihar. We visit each other every few days 
and hop across if we need any support, financial, social or 
anything else”.234 For both Hindus and Muslims, caste 
structure shapes social relations more than nationality: 
people celebrate the same festivals and practice similar 
rituals.235 Those with cross-border marital ties have several 
advantages, such as legal title to property and a greater 
chance of accessing second passports. Many on both sides 
admit they have dual citizenship, though this status is not 
recognised in either Indian or Nepali law.236 Nepali 
citizenship makes it easier for Indians to own property in 
Nepal, get visas for foreign countries, keep their assets on 
both sides, obtain admission for children in professional 
colleges under the reserved category for foreign students 
and exert political influence legitimately. For Nepalis, 
 
 
230 Many Madhesis travel to bordering states and the agriculture-
rich Punjab for seasonal employment, while people from Bihar 
work in Nepal as agricultural or construction labourers, fruit and 
vegetable vendors or semi-skilled technicians. Particular Indian 
occupational castes have always been welcome – from bangle 
sellers in Kathmandu to barbers and mattress-makers. A good 
train network and road links from Indian border towns allow 
Nepali migrants to spread across India.  
231 Crisis Group interviews, Madhesi activists, Birgunj and 
Janakpur, May 2007. This interpretation is bolstered by the 
horse-trading over border districts that went on in both the pre-
British period and following the 1814-1816 Britain-Nepal war. 
232 For example, the border is sealed during elections on either 
side for a day or two. Most border points were blocked for a 
sustained period in 1989, when Indo-Nepal relations were tense, 
and for some time after the 2001 royal massacre in Nepal. Some 
points may be blocked briefly when there is local trouble.  
233 Security was beefed up on the Indian side during the Maoist 
rebellion; the paramilitary Seema Suraksha Bal (SSB) was 
deployed on the border. 
234 Crisis Group interview, Biratnagar, 24 May 2007. 
235 Conversely, some groups – notably Tharus – have developed 
quite differently due to the different political environment on 
each side, despite sharing the same origins. See Krauskopff, 
“An ‘Indigenous Minority’ in a Border Area”, op. cit. 
236 Crisis Group interviews, Kathmandu, Janakpur and Patna, 
May-June 2007.  
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there are similar economic incentives as well as easier 
access to government offices and subsidised schemes. 
Economic interests. The open border has crucial economic 
implications. Nepal needs to import fuel and other essential 
supplies; India is more interested in access to a growing 
consumer market, while its manufacturers benefit from 
cheap labour and tax breaks when setting up joint 
ventures.237 Urban centres have emerged as both trading 
and industrial hubs but some ties are much more local: for 
example, Indian farmers get better prices in Nepal and sell 
sugarcane for processing to Nepal-based industries.238 
Politics. Inhabitants have a keen interest in the politics 
of the other side. Politicians cross over to campaign for 
friends, allies and family members.239 The fact that the 
border is sealed during elections reflects the awareness 
that such linkages are exploited on both sides. Many 
people are enrolled on voters’ lists in both countries.240 
Politicians admit there is also a tradition of hired Indian 
criminals coming over to support candidates during 
elections in Nepal.241 Border sealing does not do much 
to impede these activities; as one Indian politician 
explained, “by the time the border is sealed, everyone 
is in place anyway”.242 
Crime. The open border also brings problems. Criminal 
groups from Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, states with poor law 
and order records, use Nepal as sanctuary and operational 
base, especially for car thefts and kidnappings.243 A 
 
 
237 This is in strong contrast to the pre-liberalisation days, when 
Nepal was more important as a source of cheap imported 
consumer goods; now Indian companies want to sell.  
238 Crisis Group interview, Champaran politician, Patna, 4 June 
2007. 
239 Crisis Group interview, NC leader, Biratnagar, 24 May 
2007. Politicians say their campaigning is useful because they 
can influence relatives and other friends to support a particular 
candidate. 
240 Crisis Group interviews, border politicians and residents, 
Raxaul, Patna and Lucknow, June 2007. Double-voting has 
become harder since the Indian Election Commission 
introduced voter identity cards and the home ministry started 
issuing identity cards for residents of some border areas. 
241 Interviewees preferred to cite examples of their rivals’ 
misbehaviour. A former UML election candidate in Rajbiraj 
said his opponent had brought two jeeps with arms and ten 
criminals from India to intimidate other candidates’ supporters 
and seize voting booths. Crisis Group interview, Rajbiraj, 26 
May 2007. A member of the Bihar Legislative Assembly from 
Sitamarhi recalled helping a candidate on the Nepal side by 
preventing his rivals bringing in hired muscle from India. 
Crisis Group interviews, Rajbiraj and Patna, 5 June 2007. 
242 Crisis Group interview, Champaran politician, Patna, 4 June 
2007. 
243 Crisis Group interview, senior police officer, Lucknow, 14 
June 2007. Indian criminals have long taken stolen cars to 
crackdown by Bihar’s government coupled with Nepal’s 
weak law enforcement may have encouraged some groups 
to shift to the Tarai, especially Birgunj.244 Critics allege 
that Madhesi groups have used some of these criminals 
to incite unrest;245 there are similar allegations that anti-
Maoist vigilante groups set up under royal rule may have 
drawn on Indian criminal elements.246 Price differences 
on basic commodities, such as food grains and petroleum 
products, sustain a healthy smuggling industry.247 For the 
Indian central and state governments, a greater worry than 
all of the above is that the open border offers a soft entry 
point for Pakistani agents. 
B. INDIAN INTERESTS 
1. Central government 
The Indian establishment appears sympathetic to Madhesi 
demands but does not go out of its way to pressure 
Kathmandu for concessions. Madhesi leaders have easy 
access to senior Indian politicians and diplomats but many 
feel India takes them for granted, uses their support as a 
bargaining chip with pahadi leaders and does not support 
them substantively. A Madhesi politician said: “India 
takes us for granted because it knows we will never turn 
against them because of our unique relationship with 
Indian people. If they had supported us, Madhesis would 
not have been killed during the movement, and Koirala 
would have given in to our demands”.248 The government 
 
 
Nepal, from where they either demand a ransom or sell them. 
See also Deepak Goel, “Cross border crime in the Indo-Nepal 
border region”, in Hari Bansh Jha (ed.), Nepal-India Border 
Relations (Kathmandu, 1995), pp. 67-71. 
244 Crisis Group interview, Abhay Mohan Jha, journalist, Patna, 
4 June 2007. Bihar’s Nitish Kumar-led government, elected in 
November 2005, has been tougher on crime than its predecessor, 
the long-serving Lalu Prasad administration. There is a perception 
that crime rates have come down. 
245 Crisis Group interviews, Maoist leader, Birgunj, 28 May 
2007. Maoists allege that Indian criminals played a key role 
in the Gaur massacre along with MJF. MJF leaders deny this 
and any criminal links but admit Indians from the border 
may have attended their rallies. Crisis Group interview, MJF 
central leader, May 2007. 
246 Crisis Group interviews, Patna and Lucknow, June 2007. 
Some journalists and border politicians say Indian criminals 
hired by vigilante groups have stayed on in Nepal and may have 
acquired property. They have a strong interest in weakening the 
Maoists.  
247 Food goes from India to Nepal; petrol and diesel (subsidised 
in Nepal) go the other direction. Serious money can be made: a 
long-running scam involves gangsters paying children to carry 
small legal amounts of flour into Nepal on a rotating basis. 
Crisis Group interview, retired senior Uttar Pradesh police 
officer, Lucknow, 14 June 2007. 
248 Crisis Group interview, Biratnagar, 25 May 2007.  
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opposes Madhesi secessionist demands and in general is 
keen on a unitary state with a single point of contact in 
Kathmandu; it has little desire to deal on issues such as 
water resources with multiple regional administrations.  
Foreign policy pronouncements increasingly stress that a 
peaceful neighbourhood is essential if India is to emerge 
as a global power.249 Given the open border, a stable Tarai 
is particularly important, and New Delhi has in recent years 
developed a clearer sense of how to use economic ties to 
promote more stable (and binding) political relations. It 
encourages cross-border ties between the Tarai and Bihar 
and Uttar Pradesh and is interested in developing new rail 
links. In 2005 it opened a consulate in the southern 
industrial town of Birgunj; it has also reoriented its large 
development aid program to fund many more projects in 
border areas.250 
Achieving a unified policy towards neighbours has never 
been easy in New Delhi. Amid competing foreign policy 
priorities, Nepal receives far less attention than many 
Nepalis believe; there are also differing constituencies and 
concerns within the government and beyond. The home 
ministry and intelligence agencies view Nepal as a security 
risk for its potential as a base for “anti-India activities” 
offering easy access to underworld elements and Pakistani 
intelligence.251 There are continuing suspicions regarding 
Maoist influence and links to Indian counterparts.  
Other institutions have strong Nepal interests: the army 
includes some 40,000 Gurkha soldiers and maintains close 
army-to-army links; a long tradition of marriage between 
north Indian and Nepali royal families (both Shahs and 
Ranas) means there are influential blue-blood ties. Large 
businesses with significant Nepal investments have 
political clout. Compared to these interests, government 
composition (in either New Delhi or Kathmandu) has 
relatively little bearing on policy: the key features of the 
relationship and the parameters within which they can be 
 
 
249 Shiv Shankar Menon, “India and International Security”, 
speech at the International Institute of Strategic Studies, London, 
3 May 2007, at www.rediff.com/news/ 2007/may/04guest.htm. 
He said: “We are acutely conscious that a peaceful periphery is 
a prerequisite to sustain our growth and development”.  
250 An Indian diplomat explained: “We didn’t pay enough 
attention to the Tarai in the past but have made a conscious 
decision in recent years to increase our investment”. Crisis 
Group interview, Kathmandu, 20 June 2007. Madhesis are 
resentful of past policies and believe that even now Indian 
spending is disproportionately on pahadis. Crisis Group 
interview, Madhesi commentator, Kathmandu, 18 June 2007. 
251 The 1999 hijacking of a Kathmandu-Delhi Indian Airlines 
flight and reports of counterfeit Indian currency being introduced 
into the Indian market from Nepal fuelled these worries further. 
While India regularly demands a crackdown, independent 
observers in Nepal believe the concerns are exaggerated.  
altered are defined by factors that individual administrations 
can do little to change. 
Nevertheless, India has, since 2005, developed a more 
coherent, proactive line and secured support for it from 
most domestic constituencies. New Delhi remains strongly 
committed to assisting the peace process and ensuring 
that constituent assembly elections go ahead. This is 
partly pragmatism. Most policy-makers still believe it 
the best way for Nepal to regain stability and avoid further 
conflict. It is also about reputation since, as the silent 
framer and guarantor of the peace deals, India has invested 
considerable political capital in making the process a 
success. Seeing the elections through would also conclude 
the UN mission, which India has supported but is not keen 
to see extended indefinitely, and reduce opportunities for 
any other countries to become more involved in politics 
on the border. The ministry of external affairs views 
Madhesi issues within this broader context: demands 
for greater representation should be addressed at the 
constituent assembly and not be an excuse for derailing 
the process. 
Indian diplomats insist they have no project to destabilise 
the Tarai or use the Madhesi movement to weaken 
Maoists, although some are perfectly happy to see the 
Maoists suffer a set back.252 India has sent strong messages 
to the MJF and JTMM to reject violence but has not used 
all its leverage to drive this point home.253 Still, Indian 
analysts point out that India cannot be seen as purely pro-
Madhesi. It also has significant hill populations (both caste 
Hindus and ethnic groups) and has been through its own 
hill-plains agitations: in Darjeeling in the mid-1980s and 
in Kumaon and Garhwal more recently, leading to the 
creation of a separate Uttaranchal hill state in 2000. With 
sensitive electoral politics in these areas, Indian politicians 
cannot afford to alienate their own hill constituencies 
unthinkingly.254 
2. State governments 
In theory, Indian states do not have a say in foreign policy 
but they do have interests and some influence.255 Nepal 
shares borders with five Indian states: the longest and most 
significant are with Bihar and Uttar Pradesh; there are also 
borders with Uttaranchal, West Bengal and Sikkim. 
Nepal’s major parties, the NC and CPN, were both 
founded in Banaras (Uttar Pradesh), the centre for much 
 
 
252 Crisis Group interviews, Indian diplomats, May-June 2007. 
253 On Indian leverage over Madhesi groups, see below. 
254 Crisis Group interviews, Indian politicians and activists, 
Delhi and Lucknow, June 2007.  
255 The central government guards its foreign policy monopoly 
but some diplomats argue that bordering states should build 
more direct links to the Nepal government. Crisis Group 
telephone interview, Indian diplomat, 15 June 2007. 
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Nepali political activity during the Rana period; Bihar 
hosted many exiled politicians in the Panchayat period, 
and there were close personal ties, especially between J.P. 
Narayan’s socialists and the NC but also between Nepali 
communists and their Indian comrades. The interest 
of these neighbouring states in Nepal’s politics has 
diminished in recent decades, as have the ties between 
politicians.256 Bihar and Uttar Pradesh have high poverty 
rates and poor records on governance, development and 
law and order. In both, caste is a key feature of politics 
but communal tensions have largely been kept in check.257 
Although they are only sub-national units, their populations 
dwarf Nepal’s.258 
For both Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, spillover from the 
Madhes unrest ranks low among their security 
concerns.259 More important are flooding (especially in 
Bihar and eastern Uttar Pradesh – blamed on poor water 
flow control in Nepal);260 possible links between Nepali 
and Indian Maoists; other matters related to the porous 
border (Pakistani infiltration, smuggling, arms dealing, 
criminal refuge).261 Only after these do Madhesi issues 
figure in security terms, and even then only if they 
generate flows of refugees,262 lead to links with anti-state 
 
 
256 That J.P. Narayan was Indira Gandhi’s most prominent 
critic did not help NC’s relations with the Indian Congress 
party, which should have been its most natural partner. 
257 Lalu Prasad Yadav’s Rashtriya Janata Dal, which ruled 
Bihar from 1990 to 2005 was supported by Yadavs and 
Muslims; in 2005, it gave way to a coalition of the Janata Dal 
(United), which relied on non-Yadav intermediate castes for 
support, and the upper caste-focused Hindu nationalist BJP. 
The March-April 2007 state elections in Uttar Pradesh saw the 
Dalit-oriented Bahujan Samaj Party win an unexpected 
outright majority by allying with Brahmans and non-Yadav 
lower castes. Bihar has not had Hindu-Muslim clashes for two 
decades; Uttar Pradesh has been relatively calm since major 
riots following Hindu activists’ 1992 demolition of the Babri 
Masjid, a mosque they said had been built on the site of Hindu 
god Ram’s birthplace. 
258 In 2001, Uttar Pradesh’s population was 166 million and 
Bihar’s 83 million, see www.censusindia.net. 
259 Uttar Pradesh security officials say Lucknow has negligible 
interest in political developments across the border. In Bihar, 
senior home ministry and police officials pay attention to 
major developments in Nepal close to the border. There is 
regular police and intelligence reporting to state capitals but 
little political interest. Crisis Group interviews, government 
officials, Patna and Lucknow, June 2007. 
260 Experts admit that blaming Nepal is convenient for Bihar 
and Uttar Pradesh politicians but largely unfair. Crisis Group 
interviews, state disaster management chief and other 
government officials, Patna, June 2007. 
261 Crisis Group interviews, police officials, Lucknow, 14 
June 2007. 
262 While some officials worry about possible refugees, others 
acknowledge they could probably be easily absorbed, like the 
millions of Nepalis already living and working in India. Crisis 
Indian armed groups or intensify so that there are real 
economic effects. State politicians and administrators 
have little interest in meddling in foreign policy but do 
encourage quiet local cooperation and bend rules 
occasionally if circumstances demand.263 
3. Party perspectives 
Madhesi leaders have approached Indian politicians of 
all parties for support. Apart from the Hindu nationalist 
BJP (see below), no party has direct interest in the 
movement. India’s Congress party is not keen to see a 
Maoist/moderate-left combine sweep Nepal but 
beyond that has few partisan concerns; the fact that the 
NSP emerged along traditional Congress-leaning lines 
makes it a more natural associate in the Tarai but does 
not preclude interaction with other groups. Both 
Congress and the major national leftist parties have 
little support in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. This limits 
their influence across the border, although the fact that 
Congress leads India’s coalition government, and the 
Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPM) supports it, 
makes them essential interlocutors for Madhesi leaders. 
The CPM would like to expand its base in Bihar and 
Uttar Pradesh, which have a decisive role in shaping 
national politics, and some activists hope a strong 
parliamentary left in Nepal’s border districts might 
help.264 Naxalites, present in some parts of Bihar but 
hardly in Uttar Pradesh, had similar plans but the 
Maoists’ decision to enter mainstream politics has 
caused friction and reduced the already slim likelihood 
of serious cooperation.265 Non-aligned leftists are more 
likely to see the Madhesi movement as a subset of the 
larger issue of state restructuring and urge that it not 
degenerate into identity-based fundamentalism.266 
 
 
Group interviews, Lucknow and Patna, 14 June 2007. 
263 Local authorities, including security forces, often have strong 
informal cooperation. A retired Uttar Pradesh police officer 
cited a case of Nepal police near the border asking for Indian 
help in the face of a planned Maoist attack. Without formal 
contacts or clearance, Uttar Pradesh police deployed an armed 
company on the Indian side of the border as a deterrent. “On 
issues like this and more local-level crimes, we prefer to handle 
it on our own instead of going through tedious bureaucratic 
channels and following international law to the letter”. Crisis 
Group interview, Lucknow, 14 June. 
264 Crisis Group interviews, CPM activists, Delhi, June 2007. 
265 On Maoist-Naxalite relations, see Crisis Group Report 
Nepal’s Maoists, op. cit., pp. 8-12. Although they worry about 
risks, senior police in both states point out there has never been 
much, if any, evidence for serious links beyond the ideological. 
Crisis Group interviews, Patna and Lucknow, June 2007. 
266 Crisis Group interview, Vijay Pratap, national convenor, 
Socialist Front, New Delhi, 6 June 2007. 
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Madhesi activists have been speaking to state-level 
politicians and trying to mobilise political support but 
their efforts have either been very localised or sporadic. 
They have yet to put Madhes on the agenda (it receives 
hardly any media attention and has not been raised in state 
legislative assemblies), cultivate links with Indian-based 
organisations or set up India-based fronts along the lines 
of other parties, including the Maoists.267 They have 
developed some direct cross-border links: for example, in 
the 2007 Uttar Pradesh state assembly elections, a Hindu 
nationalist candidate promised to counter the cross-border 
Maoist threat (MJF district leaders backed him); leftist 
candidates looked to their counterparts in Nepal for 
support.268 However, even if such aid could build useful 
links, neither Bihar nor Uttar Pradesh face elections for 
some years. Unless the situation significantly deteriorates, 
Madhesi issues are unlikely to become a rallying point for 
Indian parties beyond the immediate border. 
4. The Hindu Dimension 
The relationship between the MJF and the Hindu right-
wing Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) in India is 
neither straightforward nor well documented. There are 
certainly contacts (Upendra Yadav has visited RSS 
leaders in Delhi to ask for support) but this is not 
surprising. All parties try to foster links in Delhi across 
the ideological spectrum; whom they speak to does not 
in itself reveal much about their position. Right-wing 
Hindu groups see Nepal as part of greater India (Akhand 
Bharat). They still perceive and value it as the world’s 
only Hindu state, despite its turn to secularism, and like 
that it has kept alive the traditional concept of Hindu 
kingship and the idea (beloved to high-caste, hill Nepali 
Hindus) that it preserved “pure” Hinduism untouched by 
Muslim or Christian invasion.269  
 
 
267 Unlike the Maoists, Madhesi groups have not built links 
with human rights organisations such as Patna’s People’s 
Union for Civil Liberties. Indian politicians say Madhesi 
groups visit sporadically but do not sustain their engagement 
or follow up with specific requests for help. Madhesi leaders 
do not appear to have significant ties with Lucknow politicians 
or even Uttar Pradesh border MLAs. Crisis Group interviews, 
Patna, Delhi and Lucknow, June 2007. Most Nepali parties 
have at least one pravasi (migrant/expatriate) Nepali-affiliate 
organisation in New Delhi; some have branches across India. 
The Maoist-affiliated Nepali Janadhikar Suraksha Samiti was 
at times very active in India. 
268 Crisis Group interview, Gorakhpur student leader, 
Lucknow, 15 June 2007. Yogi Adityanath, BJP MP from 
Gorakhpur, has campaigned on countering the Maoist threat 
from Nepal. On MJF-Adityanath links, see Piyush Srivastava, 
“UP’s new Naxals”, The Indian Express, 29 April 2007. 
269 The preservation of Hinduism in the face of India’s waves 
of non-Hindu rulers is part of Nepal’s founding nationalist 
Hindu activists in India know the Madhesi movement is 
unlikely to back the same values: the MJF and others may 
be flexible but their stated goal is a federal republic, not 
return to Hindu monarchical rule.270 The MJF has also 
worked to cultivate secular credentials: it has called for 
affirmative action for Muslims and has won the support 
of Muslim politicians in Bihar, which it could hardly do if 
it were hardline on religion.271 Rather than protecting 
Hinduism, it sees the Madhes movement’s main 
advantage as resistance to Maoist penetration in the Tarai 
– something no other party has managed so determinedly. 
The RSS and its ally in Nepal, the Vishwa Hindu 
Mahasangh, have always hoped to build a strong 
organisational base but have had limited success.272 Their 
efforts have been supported by the monarchy. The RSS is 
worried not only about the Maoists but also what it sees 
as rising influence of Islamic madrasas in the Tarai.273 
The RSS and its political front, the Bharatiya Janata Party 
(BJP), which is a part of the Bihar government, have been 
accused of supporting the MJF during the Tarai unrest, 
something they deny.274 The RSS’s limited strength in 
Nepal means it can offer encouragement and some aid but 
not engineer a movement. While it takes Upendra Yadav 
more seriously than other activists (his RSS contacts are 
in the border areas as well as Delhi and may have offered 
something more than moral support275) it may view 
backing the movement mainly as a chance to regain a 
foothold in Nepali politics now that the active monarchy 
appears finished.276 Even strong opponents point out that 
 
 
identity. King Prithvinarayan Shah, who united the core of the 
modern state in the late eighteenth century, defined his country 
as a “true Hindustan”. Ludwig Stiller, Prithwinarayan Shah in 
the Light of Dibya Upadesh (Kathmandu, 1968). 
270 Crisis Group interview, RSS activist, Raxaul, June 2007. The 
MJF cannot back a Hindu rashtra (nation) if it wishes to retain 
Muslim support but RSS leaders hope it will not actively oppose 
a ceremonial monarchy. 
271 Crisis Group interview, Shahid Ali Khan, Sitamarhi MLA, 
Patna, 5 June 2007. Khan says he supports the Madhesi 
movement and gave interviews to Tarai FM radio stations. 
272 Crisis Group interviews, RSS sympathisers, Raxaul and 
Delhi, June 2007. 
273 Crisis Group interview, RSS activist, Raxaul, June 2007. 
274 Crisis Group interviews, Rajiv Pratap Rudy, BJP national 
spokesperson, New Delhi, 8 June 2007, and senior RSS leader, 
New Delhi, 6 June 2007. 
275 Crisis Group interviews, journalists, Raxaul and Lucknow, 
June 2007. Some Hindu activists appear to have participated 
in the Madhesi movement; some local journalists suspect they 
may also have offered financial help. 
276 This does not mean ties to the monarchy have been severed. 
The palace’s links to maths (Hindu seminaries) in border areas 
are alive and symbolically valuable; at least one politician close 
to the RSS travelled to Kathmandu in early 2007 to meet 
Gyanendra and Crown Prince Paras. Crisis Group interview, 
senior RSS leader, New Delhi, 6 June 2007. 
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the RSS and BJP are dedicated to firm governance and 
are unlikely to seek instability in Nepal as an end in 
itself.277 
Gorakhpur (an Uttar Pradesh railhead close to the 
Bhairahawa border in central Nepal) has been the site of 
the most active involvement. Local politics there has ties 
to developments in Nepal, partly through business but 
more through Hindu connections. Gorakhpur is home to 
the Gorakhnath math, a Hindu seminary with close links 
to Nepal’s royals (Gorakhnath is the Shahs’ family 
deity). Its chief, the outspoken Hindu nationalist Yogi 
Adityanath, built his political reputation campaigning 
against the risks of Pakistani intelligence and Maoist 
influence in Nepal.278 He has extensive ties with royalist 
politicians; General Bharat Keshar Simha, a key royal 
advisor and head of the Vishwa Hindu Mahasangh is a 
frequent visitor to Gorakhpur.279 His active association 
with the town has made him, in the words of a local 
journalist, a “superhit” in the local Hindi media.280  
Adityanath also has links with Madhesi politicians and 
may have provided active support – money, people and 
ideas – to the movement. Upendra Yadav and other 
Madhesi activists attended a December 2006 meeting he 
organised in Gorakhpur.281 But a Gorakhpur observer 
pointed out that “Adityanath is not the quiet, diplomatic 
type – if he were doing something he’d loudly tell the 
world about it”.282 Several Gorakhpur-based landlords 
with major property interests in the Tarai have been 
affected by the Maoist rise and might support Madhesi 
groups. Rallies in Indian border towns venting ire at the 
Maoists do have some impact on the other side and may 




277 Crisis Group interviews, civil society activists and former 
RSS associate, Lucknow, 15 June 2007. 
278 Crisis Group interview, Gorakhpur student leader, Lucknow, 
14 June 2007; also see Piyush Srivastava, “UP’s new Naxals”, 
The Indian Express, 29 April 2007.  
279 Crisis Group interview, journalist, Lucknow, 14 June 2007. 
Simha was re-elected international president of the VHM at the 
Virat Hindu Sammelan in Gorakhpur in December 2006. He 
was chief guest at a program supported by Adityanath for select 
MLAs who won seats in the March-April 2007 state elections. 
280 Crisis Group interview, Lucknow, 14 June 2007. 
281 Crisis Group interviews, Raxaul and Lucknow, June 2007. 
A similar meeting was hosted by the RSS-associated Seema 
Jagaran Manch in Raxaul on 2-3 December 2006. Yadav and 
other Madhesi politicians attended; RSS leaders say they 
discussed the possibility of a movement. 
282 Crisis Group interview, Gorakhpur civil society activist, 
Lucknow, 14 June 2007. 
283 Crisis Group interview, journalist, Lucknow, 14 June 2007. 
The Maoists have done little to counter the perception in Indian 
border areas that they were responsible for an anti-Madhesi 
reign of terror. 
C. OTHER INTERNATIONALS 
Other international involvement in the Tarai has so far been 
limited. Powerful constituencies, including India, would 
like to keep it that way but Madhesi activists have been 
quick to appeal to outsiders and try to build foreign leverage. 
Despite a large and longstanding development agency 
presence, the Madhesi movement took internationals, like 
Kathmandu, by surprise. Even donors who since the early 
1990s had become committed to issues of social inclusion 
had paid little attention to Madhesi concerns – partly because 
of the under-representation of Madhesis on their local 
staffs. Statistics on exclusion tended to subsume Madhesis 
within broader categories or ignore them altogether.284 
Forcing internationals to wake up to their grievances 
has been one of the Madhesi activists’ most striking 
achievements. Apart from India, the U.S. is the only country 
to have taken a strong political interest in Madhesi affairs. 
It has added both JTMM factions to its terrorist list285 but 
has also reached out to Upendra Yadav, affording him a 
degree of legitimacy through well publicised meetings; 
Yadav was also granted a visa to visit the U.S for a Tarai 
diaspora event. The U.S. sees the MJF as an effective force 
which can counter Maoist influence in the Tarai and appears 
keen to promote it.286 Most development partners have 
been concerned by the impact of unrest on their programs 
and fear that worsened security may derail elections and 
possibly evolve into communal warfare. Some have started 
to review their staffing and project focuses so as to become 
more inclusive in their practices. 
The UN has taken on both public and quietly diplomatic 
roles. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights (OHCHR) has started to champion social exclusion 
as a core concerns to the delight of Madhesi activists 
but leaving some observers concerned the attention is 
disproportionate,287 while the UN mission (UNMIN) has 
 
 
284 For example, the extensive DFID/World Bank exclusion 
study “Unequal Citizens”, op. cit., paid almost no attention to 
Madhesis as a category. 
285 For details, see the 2006 country report on terrorism, released 
by the U.S. State Department’s Office of the Coordinator 
for Counterterrorism in April 2007. The overview is at 
www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2006/82734.htm.  
286 Crisis Group interview, analyst, Kathmandu, June 2007. 
287 During the movement, OHCHR mobile monitoring teams 
were in regular contact with protest organisers, authorities and 
members of the police to seek assurances protest would be 
peaceful and no excessive force would be used. It called on all 
parties to talk. OHCHR press statement, 28 January 2007. 
OHCHR Representative Lena Sundh said her office has given 
highest priority to monitoring the Tarai situation, OHCHR press 
statement, 11 February 2007. Some feel OHCHR has allowed 
inclusion issues to overshadow other central tasks such as 
building human rights capacity at a national level. Crisis Group 
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maintained contacts with key Madhesi actors and gently 
argued for dialogue. UNMIN’s mandate is limited: 
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has reiterated the need for 
an inclusive peace process but UN officials insist they can 
only become more involved at the government’s express 
request.288 Some observers are happy with this restraint 
but others believe the UN could give technical aid and use 
of its good offices more to push for dialogue.289 
 
 
interviews, human rights activist and analysts, Kathmandu, May-
June 2007. 
288 India is not keen on greater UN involvement. A senior 
diplomat warned: “Outside intervention will only exacerbate 
the conflict. It is better for the UN and others to stay out and 
not even offer technical assistance for talks”. Crisis Group 
interview, Kathmandu, 20 June 2007.  
289 An international observer pointed out that fears of Indian 
obstruction are probably exaggerated: “India can’t afford not 
to cooperate with UNMIN if it’s for the sake of the peace 
process”. Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, 22 June 2007. 
VII. PROSPECTS 
The political situation is complex, and a number of 
scenarios are possible. Fault lines cut across each other: 
Madhesis are fighting the state for their rights; political 
actors are struggling for space and support; Madhesi-
pahadi tensions have risen; and caste factors may be 
assuming a new prominence. Some of these struggles 
may be short-lived; others could become lasting features 
of a reshaped landscape. While a compromise on key 
issues is theoretically possible, further instability is 
likely, and serious deterioration is possible, especially if 
communal tensions are fanned. Governance and service 
delivery are already weak, law and order poor and the 
state’s presence severely limited – not good grounds for 
positive steps by the government. 
A. COMMUNAL RISKS … BUT INCENTIVES 
TO TALK 
The risk of communal violence between pahadis and 
Madhesis is real. The line between the struggle against the 
state and against pahadis has blurred in Madhesi politics; 
armed groups have selectively targeted pahadi bureaucrats 
and businessmen; pahadis have become insecure, and 
some are migrating;290 pahadi groups like the CBES, 
combined with heightened anti-Madhesi prejudice, have 
polarised the situation further;291 and some extremist 
 
 
290 Many Madhesis say pahadis will naturally face consequences 
for their history of exploitation. Crisis Group interviews, Madhesi 
activists, Rajbiraj, Janakpur, Birgunj, May-June 2007. Also see 
“Madhes chhadne urdi”, Samay, 10 May 2007. A senior Nepal 
expert said “ethnic cleansing” has already taken place. David N. 
Gellner, “Caste, Ethnicity and Inequality in Nepal”, Economic 
and Political Weekly, 19 May 2007, at epw.org.in/epw/uploads/ 
articles/10625.pdf. An experienced conflict expert said: “I am 
struck by how similar the mood is in the Tarai to Sri Lanka as 
the conflict was taking off – not that Nepal will inevitably follow 
that pattern but it’s a serious possibility in the future”. Crisis 
Group interview, Lalitpur, 18 June 2007. 
291 Crisis Group interviews, pahadi businessmen, Birgunj, 1 June 
2007. Some pahadis advocate outright suppression of the 
Madhes movement. They say Madhesis should give up their 
Indian loyalties before asking for rights in Nepal and fear any 
concessions would lead to an Indian influx or the start of 
a “Sikkimisation” process designed to undermine Nepal’s 
sovereignty. One commentator warned that “the formulation 
of the citizenship provision has paved a way for the distribution 
of millions of Nepali citizenship certificates to the foreigners, 
who are residing or have come from adjoining states of Bihar, 
UP, West Bengal. The decisions of the eight-party government 
and the so-called parliament persistently lack the will to safeguard 
Nepal's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity”. Madan 
Regmi, “Ganapathy forgets Prachanda”, The Kathmandu Post, 
29 May 2007. 
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groups on both sides may have an incentive to incite 
communal clashes to radicalise politics and bolster their 
support. At the same time, the situation is unlikely to 
escalate to all-out ethnic conflict. An attack on pahadis in 
a Tarai district could create a backlash against Madhesis 
elsewhere; within the Madhesi movement, a strong school 
of thought cautions against reducing the struggle for rights 
to inter-community conflict; strong economic, professional 
and social ties between the communities may play a 
balancing role; and mainstream parties and India will use 
their leverage to calm matters. 
A negotiated settlement is possible but will require a 
process that reaches out to multiple groups and allows 
all sides to claim victory. Both sides have incentives to 
talk: the government knows continued unrest in the 
Tarai could destabilise the entire political process, while 
Madhesi groups must negotiate at some stage if they are 
to deliver results, win legitimacy and become part of the 
political process. Attitudes are not irreconcilable but 
building trust will be hard. 
The government lacks a sense of urgency, while Madhesi 
groups are disunited and each may need different face-
saving measures. In early July, in the wake of internal and 
external pressure not to legitimise violence, coupled with its 
own reluctance to make concessions, whether substantive 
or symbolic, the government announced a decision to 
deploy the Armed Police Force as well as civilian police 
to deal with the violence in the Tarai.292 Though this has 
not translated into action on the ground yet, a massive 
security crackdown without addressing political grievances 
would further exacerbate the conflict, lead to human rights 
excesses, strengthen the Madhesi extremists, fuel anger 
among common citizens and make dialogue difficult. MJF 
leaders may see it as a moment to withdraw from talks and 
feel that they could benefit from more time to improve their 
organisation, prove their strength by renewed agitation or 
just wait for the political flux to take shape and guide them 
on new alliances. JTMM factions might suffer a temporary 
set-back but the possibility of serious dialogue would 
recede, and armed groups would play up the image of 
fighting against an oppressive state. 
If the government sincerely reaches out to armed groups 
and satisfies some minimum pre-conditions laid out by 
them, it is still possible to pull back from the law and order 
approach to dealing with the problem. Public efforts and 
behind-the-scenes diplomacy would make it difficult for 
both JTMM factions to remain intransigent and force them 
to engage. The format of talks may be messy – there might 
have to be a combination of separate negotiations with 
individual groups and some form of roundtable. Much 
 
 
292 “APF, police to deploy against terai violence”, The 
Kathmandu Post, 3 July 2007. 
will hinge on the broader political situation: if the country 
is moving determinedly towards elections, Madhesi leaders 
will not want to be seen as spoilers; if there is uncertainty 
and in-fighting in Kathmandu, they will be tempted to 
turn more confrontational. The armed groups face similar 
calculations but start from a weaker popular base and will 
have to concentrate first on legitimising themselves, possibly 
by supporting other groups in the electoral process. 
B. THE AGENDA 
The government and MJF sat down for preliminary 
talks on 1 June 2007 in Janakpur.293 The MJF presented 
26 demands.294 The government agreed to declare those 
killed during the movement martyrs and compensate 
their families; provide relief to the injured; include 
all marginalised groups in state institutions; distribute 
resources proportionately; restructure the state and address 
Muslim and Dalit demands.295 But it did not agree to core 
demands for proportional representation, regional autonomy 
 
 
293 The government team was headed by Ram Chandra Poudel 
and included ministers Gyanendra Karki and Ram Chandra 
Yadav. The MJF team was headed by Upendra Yadav and 
included Sitanandan Raya, Mohammed Nasir Siddiqui and 
Kishore Biswas. 
294 The major demands include: declaring all those killed during 
the movement martyrs and providing compensation; withdrawal 
of cases filed during the Madhesi movement and release of those 
arrested; UN technical assistance during talks; dismissal of Home 
Minister Sitaula; establishing participatory democracy; a federal 
system with the right to self-determination; a constitutional 
arrangement for an autonomous Madhes; appointment of 
Madhesis in government departments in Madhes; half of all 
positions in state institutions and government-owned media 
bodies for Madhesis; recognition that Madhesis have the right to 
the natural resources in Madhes; affirmative action and quotas 
for Dalits and stringent action against discrimination and 
untouchability; protection of Muslim religious and linguistic 
rights; establishment of a madrasa board; declaration of Muslim 
festivals as public holidays; creation of a Muslim personal law; 
a three-language policy in government and education which 
would allow the use of local mother tongue, Nepali or Hindi, 
and English; making it easier for Madhesis to get citizenship, 
including by sending citizenship-distribution teams to villages; 
investing at least 75 per cent of taxes raised from Madhes in the 
region; return of property seized by the Maoists; declaration of 
dates for constituent assembly elections immediately followed 
by dissolution of the interim legislature and formation of a 
representative caretaker government; an electoral system based 
fully on proportional representation; reconstitution of the election 
commission; and removal of restrictions on regional and caste-
based parties. In the talks, MJF also expressed its commitment 
to a democratic republic. MJF letter to government talks team, 1 
June 2007. 
295 Sanjaya Dhakal, “Hard Negotiations”, Spotlight, 8 June 
2007. 
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and the home minister’s dismissal.296 It also stalled on the 
MJF’s demand for UN technical assistance. While both 
sides called the talks positive, MJF leaders are privately 
sceptical about the possibility of real progress. A central 
committee member said: “We doubt whether they will 
even implement what they have agreed to, and they don’t 
seem to be in the mood to address substantive issues”.297 
If talks progress further the central agenda items are clear: 
Electoral model. Equitable electoral representation lies 
at the heart of the Madhesi movement. Calls for “full 
proportional representation”, essentially referring to quotas 
for different population groups, have gained ground but 
there is still some attachment to having some local, 
constituency-based representatives.298 The government 
introduced an amendment to the electoral law in mid-June 
2007 but did so without consulting protesting groups. It 
provides reservations for excluded groups within the 
proportional representation category, with parties also to 
make a principled commitment to include candidates of all 
groups in the first-past-the-post system.299 The NC, the 
most powerful party in the ruling alliance, has made it clear 
that a fully proportional system is unacceptable. The MJF 
has publicly opposed the law but may agree to come on 
board as it does not want to be seen as the only spoiler.300 
Fixing 22 November as the constituent election date, the 
cabinet promised to address all inclusivity issues and agree 
on a mixed electoral system acceptable to protestors. That 
the announcement was not blocked by Madhesis within 
the major parties suggests a deal is possible. If so, the key 
 
 
296 “MJF presents 26 point demands”, www.nepalnews.com, 1 
June 2007. 
297 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, 22 June 2007. 
298 Crisis Group interviews, Madhesi activists, Kathmandu 
and various districts, May-June 2007. 
299 “House approves CA bill”, www.nepalnews.com, 14 
June 2007. Out of 497 seats, 240 are allotted for proportional 
representation. Within that, 15.6 per cent of seats have been set 
aside for Madhesi men and women each, 6.5 per cent for Dalit 
men and women, 18.9 percent for janjati men and women, 2 per 
cent for men and women of backward regions and 15.1 per cent 
each for the “others” category. The parties have also committed 
themselves in principle to include candidates of excluded groups 
in direct constituency elections for 240 seats. Seventeen delegates 
are to be nominated.  
300 Crisis Group interview, Kishore Biswas, MJF leader, 
Kathmandu, 29 June 2007. The MJF says that the law is not 
transparent; parties may not give tickets to Madhesi candidates 
in the direct constituency contests since this is not legally 
required; and it should have been consulted before the law was 
framed. Some Madhesi politicians argue that Madhesis will lose 
out under the system, because Madhesi groups will be forced to 
give seats to all other groups in the same proportion and will not 
be able to allocate all seats they win only to Madhesi candidates. 
Crisis Group interview, NC dissident, Janakpur, July 2007. 
issue will be redrawing constituencies fairly, something 
the ECDC appointed in March 2007 has failed to do. Its 
recommendations – to increase constituent assembly seats 
to 497 and add 28 in the Tarai – were rejected by Madhesi 
groups, who saw gerrymandering to benefit pahadi 
candidates. The government has extended the ECDC 
mandate by 21 days301 to draft a new plan, still a challenging 
task as an acceptable compromise will require taking into 
account concerns of all Madhesi MPs and implementing 
commitments on Madhesi candidates. A Madhesi analyst 
said, however: “People may not be completely satisfied 
but will accept the system. We started from a sub-zero 
position and have now got to 30 per cent. Any jump higher 
right now and there is a risk of falling over”.302 
Federalism, autonomy and self-determination. 
Although the constituent assembly is meant to have the 
final say, the government has already declared its intent 
to introduce federalism. Many groups, including janajati 
representatives, call for federalism but have different 
understandings. The stronger Madhesi demand for “self-
determination” does not go down well with hill groups 
or Tarai janajatis.303 There has been little discussion of 
fiscal implications such as division of local tax revenues 
and sharing of development investment or of the degree 
of devolution.  
The Madhesi call for a single “Madhes government” is a 
powerful rallying cry and is gaining increasing acceptance 
as a political slogan but is highly unlikely to be acceptable 
to the Kathmandu establishment. The demand may be 
diluted but there is a consensus among Madhesis, across 
party lines, that federal units should not be carved out north-
south, with built-in hill dominance (as in the Panchayat-
designed development regions). This demand will be hard 
for the government to deny. The possibility of secession 
features frequently in conversation among Madhesis (even 
those in mainstream national parties and the NSP). Several 
Madhesi groups, including MJF and JTMM(JS), reportedly 
held a meeting in Patna in May 2007 and requested Ram 
Raja Prasad Singh, a veteran republican leader from 
Madhes, to assume leadership of a struggle for complete 
independence. Singh says he rejected the offer.304 This 
 
 
301 “CA poll on 22 November”, The Kathmandu Post, 25 June 
2007. 
302 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, June 2007. 
303 In the words of the Nepal Federation of Indigenous 
Nationalities president, Pasang Sherpa, “our friends in the 
Madhesi movement call for ‘one Madhes, one province’ but we 
disagree. The Madhes’s various janajatis have a different 
identity…[Madhesi activists’] interpretation of self-determination 
and our interpretation are also different”. Sherpa also stressed 
that janajatis had stuck to peaceful protests, unlike many Madhesi 
groups. Interview, Jana Aastha, 20 June 2007. 
304 Tilak Pathak, “Patna baithakko antarkatha”, Nepal, 1 July 
2007. 
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reflects an effort by Madhesi groups to forge a common 
front as well as a gradual radicalisation of the mood. Yet, 
few perceive independence as more than an aspiration or 
initial bargaining position. The Madhesi elite with serious 
economic interests in Kathmandu would oppose it; the 
demand is completely unacceptable to India; and it would 
be a recipe for communal violence. 
While the government and several analysts say that the 
shape of the federal structure should be left to the 
constituent assembly, Madhesi groups are demanding 
some guarantees on the basic principles of that structure, 
even if the specific contours and implementation are 
postponed.305 Federalism is a complex issue, and it 
might be best to leave it to the elected assembly. For 
now, in order to show serious intent, the government 
could consider setting up a purely technical commission 
to develop data and information for future discussions; 
parties, for their part, could set up internal committees to 
begin homework on the issue.  
Movement aftermath. Demands that relate to the 
aftermath of the January-February 2007 movement are 
both psychologically important and relatively painlessly 
addressed. Recognising dead Madhesi protestors as martyrs, 
offering compensation to families and the injured and 
pushing forward the commission of enquiry all have little 
political cost. The government has agreed to most in 
principle and prompt implementation could build goodwill 
before the next round of talks. The resignation of Home 
Minister Sitaula, earlier an unshakeable MJF precondition, 
has slipped down the agenda but not been forgotten. The 
idea that at least one member of the government should 
accept moral responsibility and consequences remains 
powerful. Prime Minister Koirala is not keen to lose a 
trusted lieutenant, and the Maoists have also backed 
Sitaula, who has been a key member of peace talks. But a 
critical verdict from the commission of enquiry might be 
an opportunity to let him go.  
The withdrawal of criminal cases against MJF and JTMM 
leaders will be a thorny topic, particularly as killings and 
abductions continue. Some in the government still view 
them as criminals and will be extremely reluctant to drop 
charges as a price for talks. But the need for carrots as 
well as sticks could well lead to a quiet amnesty for those 
who sign up to the political process. 
Affirmative action. The government has commited 
in principle to include Madhesis in state institutions but 
an activist said: “We have heard these promises several 
 
 
305 Crisis Group interview, Upendra Yadav, 28 June 2007. He 
recalled that in India, Jawaharlal Nehru presented an objectives 
resolution laying out basic principles, which guided discussions 
in its constituent assembly.  
times. What is needed is action”.306 The government can 
bridge this trust deficit by immediately appointing one 
third Madhesis to important bodies like the National Human 
Rights Commission and National Planning Commission; 
making special provisions for their recruitment in police 
and bureaucracy; reserving a percentage of local posts in 
the Tarai for them; organising training so they can compete 
at the national level; and appointing deserving Madhesi 
bureaucrats to important positions both nationally and in 
Tarai towns. These steps should also be specifically 
targeted to women and other marginalised communities 
like Muslims and Dalits. Other decisions could include 
infrastructure development programs such as road extension 
and irrigation. The government must be sensitive not to 
appear to be buying off people with economic packages 
without addressing political concerns but these steps taken 
together would address demands of Madhesis, reduce the 
visible dominance of pahadis in all spheres and create an 
environment for talks with still protesting groups.  
C. FIXING KATHMANDU FIRST 
None of the Tarai tensions can be viewed in isolation. The 
Madhes is not a discrete geographical unit unaffected 
by its surroundings, nor are its politics regionally 
compartmentalised. Dealing with Madhesi demands first 
means changing attitudes and policies in Kathmandu; it 
also requires addressing issues within a national framework 
– many grievances in the plains stem from similar causes 
to those that could destabilise the hills. Despite repeated 
commitments to satisfy demands (including the prime 
minister’s explicit promise when the 22 November 2007 
election date was announced)307 there is little sign of the 
kind of shift in mentality that might persuade protestors 
that this time leaders are serious. 
Even if a basic compromise is agreed, sequencing is tricky. 
Managing the choreography well would put spoilers 
in a tough position. Much of the current atmosphere of 
lawlessness is conditioned by political uncertainty. 
An electoral timetable, forward momentum and solid 
international support would turn the situation around, 
making it much harder for small factions to disrupt the 
process – and forcing them to come on board if they hope 
for a share of the spoils. If the MJF joins all other major 
parties in standing for election, the JTMM factions may 
prefer to bargain their support for strengthened policy 
positions and personal guarantees on rehabilitation. The 




306 Crisis Group interview, Rajeev Jha, Janakpur, 29 May 2007. 
307 “Dissenting groups’ demands will be fulfilled before polls, 
assures PM”, ekantipur.com, 25 June 2007. 
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A unified eight-party demonstration of intent to proceed 
with elections would be one of the best ways to bring 
protestors to the table. But preparations for polls must be 
coupled with serious engagement with protesting groups. 
A constituent assembly which faces opposition from the 
outset might face a crisis of credibility, not command 
bipartisan support and encourage different political forces 
to question its decisions. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
There is no guarantee a deal on elections would halt all 
political violence: The presence of determined armed 
groups, Maoist ambivalence on further street action and 
retention of military capacity, the MJF’s occasional violent 
actions and the response from its rivals are all dangers. 
Strained relationships, especially between Madhesi 
activists and Maoists, suggest turbulence, even if the 
emergence of new alliances gradually delivers a more 
stable configuration. Sustained agitation along the lines of 
the January-February movement would be difficult for any 
group but localised incidents are easy enough to organise, 
as are the established techniques to intimidate voters and 
influence elections. Perfect polls in an entirely peaceful 
environment are not in the cards but a sensible, balanced 
and determined approach from a united Kathmandu can 
still deliver a reasonable outcome. 
Internationals have a role to play. Should it choose (and 
the signs are it will), India can exert considerable leverage 
on all parties for viable elections. Apart from putting 
pressure on Kathmandu to deliver on promises, hard 
security measures (such as cracking down on armed 
groups seeking refuge across the border and bolstering the 
Nepali government’s policing capacity), the threat of 
withdrawing moral support, freezing activists out of Delhi 
and leaning on funders can hit home. All external actors 
can help by supporting efforts towards peace (including 
full implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Accord), 
respecting the principles of the process rather than engaging 
in partisan politics and extending strong public support 
for each step forward. There is a danger that warnings of 
insecurity making polls impossible and predictions of ethnic 
warfare could become self-fulfilling. Nepal’s friends are 
right to be concerned at the risks but should be cautious 
about playing into the hands of those who seek to derail 
the entire peace process. 
There are no quick fixes or ideal solutions. Addressing 
demands for representation and rethinking the nature of 
the nation are tough tasks that will remain long after the 
elections. Ethnic, caste and regional mobilisation is likely 
to be a lasting feature of the political landscape. India’s 
example suggests that a flexible constitutional framework 
and robust electoral competition are viable means of dealing 
with identity-based demands reasonably peacefully. Nepal’s 
circumstances are not identical, and there is no reason 
why its political institutions should ape those of its 
neighbour, but to do better will mean embarking on a long 
road towards a more inclusive state. 
Even assuming the constituent assembly goes ahead, 
factors such as the debate it generates and new political 
alliances will affect progress towards a lasting resolution. 
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Many Madhesis suspect further agitation will be necessary 
at some stage. They may well be right: Nepal’s political 
history, from the 1950 “revolution” to the 1990 people’s 
movement, suggests that fundamental change always 
encounters institutional and political resistance and is 
never achieved in one bound. This is frustrating for 
impatient activists but a gradual release of pressure (albeit 
with violent phases) is more likely than a dramatic collapse 
into anarchy. Political leaders will have to dig deeper to 
find the patience, compromise and broad-mindedness to 
manage the process of change. 
Kathmandu/Brussels, 9 July 2007 
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BJP Bharatiya Janata Party 
BSP Bahujan Samaj Party 
CA Constituent Assembly 
CBES Chure Bhawar Ekta Samaj 
CDO Chief District Officer 
CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
CPI Communist Party of India 
CPI (Maoist) Communist Party of India (Maoist) 
CPM Communist Party of India (Marxist) 
CPN(M)  Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) 
ECDC Electoral Constituency Delimitation Commission 
HSS Hindu Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS’s Nepal affiliate) 
JTMM Janatantrik Tarai Mukti Morcha (in two factions: Jwala Singh (JS) and Goit (G)) 
KMM Krantikari Madhesi Morcha (Janamorcha front) 
LMS Loktantrik Madhesi Sangathan (UML front) 
MJF Madhesi Janadhikar Forum 
MLA Member of Legislative Assembly (in state legislatures in India) 
MPRF Madhesi Janadhikar Forum (acronym formed from English translation: Madhesi People’s Rights 
Forum) 
MRMM Madhesi Rashtriya Mukti Morcha (Madhesi National Liberation Front), Maoist front 
NC Nepali Congress 
NC(D) Nepali Congress (Democratic) 
NSP(A) Nepal Sadbhavana Party (Anandidevi) 
NWPP Nepal Workers and Peasants’ Party 
OHCHR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
PLA People’s Liberation Army (Maoist) 
RPP Rashtriya Prajatantra Party 
RSS Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh 
SP Samajwadi Party 
SPA Seven-Party Alliance (includes NC, UML, NSP(A), NC(D), Janamorcha Nepal, NWPP and ULF) 
ULF United Left Front 
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UML Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) 
UNMIN United Nations Mission in Nepal 
UP Uttar Pradesh 
VHM Vishwa Hindu Mahasangh 
VHP Vishwa Hindu Parishad 
YCL Young Communist League 
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CHRONOLOGY OF KEY MADHES EVENTS 
 
 
1951: Nepal Tarai Congress formed under Vedanand Jha. 
1952: First Citizenship Act introduced. 
1957: Imposition of Nepali as sole language for education sparks protests in Tarai. 
1959: NC sweeps first democratic elections; Nepal Tarai Congress wins no seats. 
1964: New Citizenship Act based on 1962 Panchayat constitution makes it harder for Madhesis to acquire 
citizenship. 
1979: King Birendra holds referendum on Panchayat system; higher support for multi-party democracy in 
Tarai districts. 
1983: Nepal Sadbhavana Parishad formed under Gajendra Narayan Singh to raise Madhesi issues. 
1990: People’s movement brings Panchayat system to an end. New constitution promulgated. Nepal 
Sadbhavana Parishad registers as party to contest elections but demands constituent assembly. 
1994: Government sets up Dhanapati Commission on citizenship issue. 
1996: Maoists launch insurgency. 
1997: Madhesi Janadhikar Forum (MJF) established in Biratnagar as cross-party intellectual platform. 
2000: Maoists set up Madhesi Rashtriya Mukti Morcha (MRMM) under Jai Krishna Goit in Siliguri. 
2004: Matrika Yadav appointed as head of MRMM; Goit splits and forms the Janatantrik Tarai Mukti Morcha 
(JTMM). 
2006 
24 April: Following nineteen-day mass movement, king announces reinstatement of parliament. 
18 May: Parliamentary proclamation curtails royal powers and declares Nepal a secular state; Hindu organisations, 
especially in the Tarai, protest. 
17 July: Matrika Yadav announces war against JTMM. 
August-October: Jwala Singh expelled from JTMM and forms his own faction. Frequent JTMM strikes (both factions) 
affect normal life in Tarai. Increasing Maoist-JTMM and JTMM factional clashes. 
23 September: JTMM(G) activists shoot dead RPP MP Krishna Charan Shrestha in Siraha. 
22 October: JTMM(G) expresses willingness to talk; government agrees in principle (26 October) but makes no 
move for negotiations. 
26 November: Citizenship law amended enabling Madhesis to get citizenship certificates and associated rights. 
16 December: NSP(A) protests interim constitution provisions on electoral system and its silence on federalism. 
JTMM(JS) imposes prohibition on non-Madhesis driving on Tarai roads for a fortnight.  
26 December: NSP(A) protest turns violent in Nepalgunj; communal aspects with pahadi-Madhesi clashes, while 
police accused of anti-Madhesi bias. Government forms commission to investigate (27 December). 
30 December: Prime Minister Koirala expresses his willingness to solve Tarai problem through talks. Ian Martin, special 
representative of the UN Secretary-General, voices concern about violent activities in eastern Tarai. 
2007 
6 January: JTMM(JS) expresses willingness to talk to government under UN auspices. 
12 January: Three-day Tarai strike called by JTMM(G). 
Nepal’s Troubled Tarai Region 
Crisis Group Asia Report N°136, 9 July 2007 Page 39 
 
 
16 January: MJF announces strike in Tarai to protest interim constitution’s promulgation. Its leaders are arrested 
while burning copies of the statute in Kathmandu. 
19 January: Maoists clash with MJF activists in Lahan, killing student Ramesh Kumar Mahato. 
20 January: Maoist cadres seize and cremate Mahato’s body; Lahan put under curfew. 
21 January-7 February: Movement picks up across eastern Tarai against the government and Maoists, with growing 
public support, mass defiance of curfews, clashes between police and protestors, attacks on government 
offices and almost 40 people killed. Maoists accuse feudal elements and royalists of inciting unrest and 
reject talks. 
29 January: NSP(A) minister Hridayesh Tripathi resigns from government. Government arrests former royal 
ministers on charges of instigating violence. 
31 January: Prime Minister Koirala makes national television address appealing for dialogue; protestors reject the 
offer. 
2 February: Government forms committee led by Mahant Thakur to talk to all agitating groups. 
7 February: Koirala makes second address; government agrees to introduce federalism and allot half the seats in the 
constituent assembly to Tarai. 
8 February: MJF cautiously welcomes Koirala’s address, suspends agitation for ten days and sets preconditions for 
talks: home minister’s resignation, declaration of all those killed as martyrs and a Madhesi-led, 
independent panel to investigate atrocities. 
11 February: Madhesi MPs demand immediate amendment of interim constitution. 
13 February: JTMM(JS) agrees to talk and halt violence. JTMM(G) rejects talks offer (14 February). 
15 February: Home Minister Sitaula apologises for mistakes during Tarai unrest but refuses to quit. 
19 February: MFJ renews its agitation, saying government failed to create environment for talks. JTMM(G) calls 
three-day Tarai shutdown (21 February).  
22 February: Thakur committee asks government to withdraw all charges against JTMM factions to create 
environment for talks.  
1 March: Madhesi Tigers abduct eleven people from Saptari. 
4 March: JTMM(JS) resumes armed revolt, accusing government of not wanting negotiations. 
6 March: NSP(A) threatens to leave SPA if interim constitution is not amended.  
9 March: Legislature amends interim constitution creating Electoral Constituency Delimitation Commission 
(ECDC) to revise constituencies and guaranteeing federalism. 
21 March: MJF-Maoist clash in Gaur, killing 27 Maoists and leaving dozens injured. Curfew imposed. 
Government forms panel to investigate and submit report in fifteen days (23 March). MJF protests 
banned in Rautahat, Siraha, Jhapa and Morang (24 March). 
11 April: Peace and Reconstruction Minister Ram Chandra Poudel calls MJF and JTMM for talks. 
18 April: Madhesi MPs reject ECDC recommendations, demand fresh census and block functioning of interim 
legislature for over a month. 
20 April: OHCHR investigation holds law enforcement agencies, MJF and Maoists jointly responsible for Gaur 
massacre. 
26 April: MJF applies to the Election Commission to register as a political party. 
10 May: Ram Chandra Poudel meets MJF president Upendra Yadav in Birgunj. 
13 May: JTMM(G) kills JTMM(JS) district chairman of Rautahat. JTMM(JS) retaliates by killing two 
JTMM(G) activists.  
25 May: Cabinet forms commission to investigate killings during the Tarai unrest. 
1 June: Government-MJF talks in Janakpur; MJF presents 26 demands. 
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8 June: NSP factions merge under banner of Nepal Sadbhavana Party (Anandidevi). 
13 June: Two Maoists killed in clash with MJF in Rupandehi. 
22 June: MRMM central committee dissolved after differences between Matrika Yadav and Prabhu Sah. 
Ram Kumari Yadav appointed co-ordinator of new ad-hoc committee; Prachanda takes charge of 
the party’s eastern Tarai region. 
24 June: Government announces 22 November date for constituent assembly elections; extends ECDC term by 
21 days so it can review its earlier report. 
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